Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory Practice and Law by Tracht, Marshall E.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 82
Issue 2 January 1997 Article 2
Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling
Theory Practice and Law
Marshall E. Tracht
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation







I. CURRENT LAW AND PRACTICE ............................ 303
A. Restraints on Bankruptcy Filing or Eligibility ........ 305
B. Waivers of the Automatic Stay ...................... 311
C. Bankruptcy Disincentives ........................... 313
D. Conclusion ......................................... 314
II. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND BANKRUPTCY WAIVERS ......... 315
A. Waivers and the Economic Theory of Bankruptcy... 315
B. Administrative Costs and the Efficiency of
Bankruptcy ......................................... 321
III. WAIVERS AND BANKRUPTCY SORTING ...................... 326
A. The Bankruptcy Sorting Process .................... 326
B. Accuracy of Contractual v. Judicial Assessments ..... 328
C. Appropriateness of Contractual Assessments ........ 332
IV. REFINING THE MODEL ................................... 334
A. Prejudice to Unsecured Creditors ................... 335
B. Asymmetric Information and Management
Incentives .......................................... 340
C. The Problem of Unsophisticated Borrowers ......... 341
D. Waivers and Workouts .............................. 344
E. Conclusion ......................................... 348
V. PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF
W AIVERS ................................................ 349
Conclusion .................................................... 355
* Permission is hereby granted for copies of this Article to be made and used by
nonprofit institutions for educational purposes, provided that the author and Comel Law
Review are identified and that proper notice of copyright is affixed to each copy.
t Associate Professor, Hofstra University School of Law (lawmet@hofstra.edu); J.D.,
M.B.A., 1990, University of Pennsylvania; BA, 1983, Yale University. I am extremely grate-
ful to Alan Resnick, Vem Walker, and Norman Silber for their helpful comments on ear-
lier drafts of this Article.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
It is commonly said that a business' may not waive its right to
protection under the Bankruptcy Code and that any attempt to do so
is void as against public policy. Over the past few years, however,
bankruptcy scholars have argued that it would be economically effi-
cient to allow firms to renounce their right of access to the bankruptcy
courts.2 At the same time, corporate and bankruptcy lawyers have be-
come increasingly adept at designing techniques that keep firms from
utilizing the bankruptcy laws without running afoul of the law's hostil-
ity to waivers. Thus, we have created a situation in which both theory
and practice are increasingly at odds with the established view of the
law-a conflict which has gone largely unaddressed in the legal litera-
ture. Moreover, as courts have recently begun to grapple with these
new bankruptcy avoidance techniques, they have responded in an ad
hoc manner that reflects the absence of a framework for analyzing
waivers under the Bankruptcy Code. The purpose of this Article is to
offer a reasoned approach to the analysis of bankruptcy waivers, com-
bining the economic justifications for bankruptcy law with the legal
structure of the Code.
Bankruptcy waivers raise fundamental questions about the nature
and purposes of the bankruptcy system, and the confusion about waiv-
ers highlights the absence of a uniform explanation for bankruptcy
law. During the past decade, bankruptcy theory has been dominated
by a debate between proponents of economic models that emphasize
bankruptcy as a wealth-maximizing solution to the collective action
problem facing creditors of insolvent firms, and critics who see
broader social goals for the bankruptcy system.3 Economic analyses
suggest that waivers could enhance the functioning of the bankruptcy
system, benefiting both firms and their creditors.4 However, critics
are troubled because bankruptcy waivers, even if they are wealth-maxi-
1 This Article does not address the waivability of bankruptcy rights by natural per-
sons, only by business debtors. See infra text accompanying note 24.
2 See infra note 4.
3 For an extensive bibliography on the debate over the creditors' bargain model and
other attempts to provide a normative foundation for bankruptcy law, see LindaJ. Rusch,
Bankruptcy Reorganization Jurisprudence: Matters of Belief Faith and Hope-Stepping into the
Fourth Dimension, 55 MoNT. L. REv. 9, 10 n.1 (1994).
4 See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15J. LEGAL STUD.
127 (1986); James W. Bowers, The Fantastic Wsconsylvania Zero-Bureaucratic-Cost School of
Bankruptcy Theory: A Comment 91 MICH. L. REv. 1773, 1786-88 (1993) (citing Rasmussen);
Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach To Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 51 (1992) (advocating legislative creation of bankruptcy options to which firms could
bind themselves in advance); Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts, 86J.L
& ECON. 595 (1993) (arguing that bankruptcy waivers would permit workouts to succeed
where they now fail).
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mizing for firms and their creditors, may adversely affect employees,
suppliers, customers, and the community at large.5
This Article challenges the accepted view that bankruptcy waivers
are unenforceable under the Bankruptcy Code. Waivers have a poten-
tially valuable role to play under the Code, and this role does not de-
pend on the normative conclusions of wealth-maximizing economists
or deny broader concerns a place in bankruptcy jurisprudence. How-
ever, waivers cannot be held enforceable per se under the Bankruptcy
Code. Waivers should be enforced in many cases; in other cases, waiv-
ers may provide information useful in considering the proper disposi-
tion of the bankruptcy case; and some waivers should be disregarded
completely. As shown below, the proper role of contractual bank-
ruptcy waivers follows from an understanding of their evidentiary im-
port in the context of Bankruptcy Code requirements. 6
Part I begins with a discussion of the various types of commonly
used bankruptcy avoidance techniques and their treatment under the
case law. Part II discusses the basic economic functions of business
bankruptcy and provides an initial analysis of the waiver of bankruptcy
rights in light of these functions. It then examines the empirical sup-
port for this initial analysis. Part III considers the role of waivers in
furthering a central task in the bankruptcy process-sorting viable
businesses from lost causes-and connects the economic function of
bankruptcy waivers to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. In par-
ticular, Part III focuses on the accuracy and appropriateness of con-
tractual versus judicial determinations of these matters. Part IV
considers some potential objections to waivers, and expands the analy-
sis to include problems raised by asymmetric information and agency
costs, concluding that economic theory supports the enforcement of
informed, consensual bankruptcy waivers. It also considers the case of
unsophisticated borrowers, and a special situation in which waivers
often arise-as provisions in prebankruptcy restructuring attempts.
Part V applies the analysis of Parts I through IV, and offers a coherent
approach to the enforcement of waivers under existing law. The final
section offers some conclusions and observations.
I
CURRENT LAW AND PRACTICE
As bankruptcy filings increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 7
commercial lawyers became more sophisticated in dealing with poten-
5 See infra Part Im.C.
6 See infra Parts JIl, V.
7 Business bankruptcies increased from 47,415 in 1981, see U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcT OF THE UN=TED STATES 541 tbi.865 (113th
ed. 1993), to a high of 88,278 in 1987, before levelling off in the 60,000 to 70,000 range.
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tial bankruptcy issues both in structuring new transactions and in re-
structuring existing ones. This change precipitated an increased
awareness of the direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy, including
legal fees, delay, and the opportunity for borrowers to use bankruptcy
as a strategic weapon with which an insolvent firm's equity holders
could keep some of the firm's value from its creditors.8 In light of this
growing understanding of the costs and risks of bankruptcy, creditors
often agreed to workouts in which they made concessions (for exam-
ple, forbearing from enforcement or foreclosure) in order to avoid
bankruptcy. Over time, however, it became clear that these conces-
sions often accomplished little, because nothing in the workout
barred the firm from subsequently filing for bankruptcy. Thus, a
creditor could make concessions and still face all of the costs it had
hoped to avoid.
As a result, creditors now commonly bargain for protections
against a subsequent bankruptcy filing as part of a workout.9 How-
ever, understanding that courts will not permit a firm to waive its eligi-
bility for bankruptcy protection, creditors typically seek less direct
ways to accomplish a similar result. These provisions can be divided
into three broad categories: restraints on bankruptcy access; waivers of
specific bankruptcy rights (generally, the automatic stay); and incen-
tives to refrain from utilizing the bankruptcy laws.
See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 553 tbl.864 (115th ed. 1995).
8 See infra Part II.B.
9 See Jeffrey W. Warren & Wendy V.E. England, Pre-petition Waiver Of The Automatic
Stay Is Not Per SeEnforceable, AM. BAN'nu. INST.J., Mar. 1994, at 22, 22 ("Practically every loan
modification or business workout agreement drafted today contains a series of boilerplate
'bankruptcy waiver' provisions."). The growing use of such provisions is reflected in the
recent practitioners' literature on their drafting and enforcement. See, e.g., ALvsN L. AR-
NOLD, REAL ESTATE INVESTOR'S DESKBOOK § 11.04[8] (3d ed. 1994); MICHAEL T. MADISON
Er A.., THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING, F12-42 (rev. ed. 1996); Craig H. Averch, Bank-
ruptcy Issues: Emphasizing Drafting Considerations in Protecting Against Insolvency (Including Se-
lected Issues in Single Asset Real Estate Bankruptcies), in REAL. ESTATE DEFAULTS, WORKOUTS,
AND REORGANIZA TIONS 303 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials Vol. 1, Phila., Pa., Sept. 22-
24, 1994); Mikel R. Bistrow &James Baillie, Waiver of Bankruptcy Protections in Pre-Bankruptcy
Workout Agreements, in BUSINESS WORKOUTS MANUAL (Supp. 1994), reprinted in NEGOTIATING
"No SECOND BrrE" CLAUSES AND OTHER BANKRUPTCY WArvERs IN DEBT RESTRUCrURING
(A.BA Sec. of Bus. Law, New Orleans, La., Aug. 8, 1994); David L Campbell & Julie E.
Lennon, Drafting Bankruptcy Relief Clauses in Loan Documents, 10 PRAC. REAL EST. LAw. 27
(1984); Thomas M. Mayer, "Bankruptcy-Proof' Entities, "Bankruptcy-Resistant" Workouts, and
Tolling Agreements, in REAL ESTATE WORKOUTS AND BANKuwrCiES 37 (PU Real Est. Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. N-402, 1994); Scotta E. McFarland, Waivers of Bank-
ruptcy Rights in Workout Agreements, PROB. & PROP., Nov./Dec. 1994, at 15;John P. McNicho-
las, Note, Prepetition Agreements and the Implied Good Faith Requiremen 1 AM. BAN . INST. L.
REv. 197 (1993).
[Vol. 82:301
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A. Restraints on Bankruptcy Filing or Eligibility
For a creditor that wants to avoid entanglement in a firm's bank-
ruptcy, the most effective remedy would be a waiver of the firm's abil-
ity to be a debtor under the bankruptcy laws, relegating the firm and
its creditors to state-law collection proceedings. I refer to this as a
waiver of bankruptcy eligibility.10 More limited waivers might bar a
firm from attempting to reorganize through bankruptcy but would al-
low it to remain eligible for bankruptcy liquidation," or would bar a
voluntary bankruptcy filing by a firm but not purport to limit the abil-
ity of creditors to file an involuntary bankruptcy against it. 12
A firm cannot waive its bankruptcy eligibility entirely, because the
Code grants creditors the right to file an involuntary petition against a
firm and there is no apparent way for a firm to extinguish this right.
Nor can a firm waive its right to convert a liquidation case to reorgani-
zation; this is barred by the only provision in the Bankruptcy Code
specifically addressing waivers.' 3 Thus, of the possible waivers regard-
ing access to bankruptcy, we are left only with the question of whether
a firm can waive its light to file a voluntary petition.
Although there is little case law on this question, courts seem to
accept, almost as a matter of faith, that commercial agreements waiv-
ing the right to file for bankruptcy are unenforceable. Several deci-
sions suggesting a constitutional right to file for bankruptcy-an idea
that is patently incorrect-indicate just how deep the roots of this con-
viction lie. 14
10 References to bankruptcy "eligibility" include the availability of bankruptcy relief
on either a voluntary or involuntary basis. Thus, a waiver of eligibility is broader than a
simple waiver of a firm's right to initiate a voluntary bankruptcy case.
11 Such a waiver would presumably be invalid under 11 U.S.C. § 706(a), which pro-
vides that any waiver of the right to convert a Chapter 7 case to a case under Chapter 11,
12, or 13 is unenforceable. 11 U.S.C. § 706(a) (1994).
12 A bankruptcy case may be commenced by the filing of a bankruptcy petition by the
debtor, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1994), called a voluntary petition. Alternatively, cred-
itors may file an involuntary bankruptcy petition against a debtor pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 303 (1994), which will result in a bankruptcy case if the creditors can show that the
debtor is generally not paying its debts as they come due, or that a custodian was appointed
to take possession of substantially all of the debtor's assets within 120 days before the filing
of the petition.
13 See 11 U.S.C. § 706(a) (1994). The legislative history of the Code indicates that the
Code's silence on other waivers was not meant as an endorsement of such waivers. See 124
CONG. REc. 32,401 (1978) ("The explicit reference in title 11 forbidding the waiver of
certain rights is not intended to imply that other rights, such as the right to file a voluntary
bankruptcy case under section 301, may be waived."). Nonetheless, § 706(a) indicates that
Congress was aware of the issue and declined to outlaw waivers of bankruptcy rights.
14 See, e.g., In re Citadel Properties, Inc., 86 B.R. 275, 275 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988)
("The Court pauses to suggest that a total prohibition against filing for bankruptcy would
be contrary to Constitutional authority as well as public policy."). The idea appears to have
originated in Merritt v. Mt. Forest Fur Farms of Am., Inc. (In re Mt. Forest Farms of Am.,
Inc.), 103 F.2d 69, 71 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 308 U.S. 583 (1939). Mt. ForestFur'referred to
a "constitutional right to relief under § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act. Art. 1, § 8, clause 4,
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Although numerous courts have commented in dicta on the
unenforceability of a firm's waiver of the right to file bankruptcy, few
cases actually raise the issue and none analyze it.15 The only pre-Code
case directly on point appears to be In re Los Angeles Lumber Products
Co., 16 in which the court refused to dismiss a voluntary reorganization
filing on the basis of a bond indenture provision that barred the firm
from invoking any law that would alter, impair, or impede the bond-
holders' rights and remedies. "[Any such attempted restriction upon
the debtors' rights even in a voluntary proceeding would seem to this
court to be void, as contrary to public policy."17 The court made no
effort, however, to identify the "public policy" at issue or to explain
how the waiver violated it.
Constitution of the United States, U.S.CA." Id. M. Forest Fur is then cited in In re Donald-
son Ford, Inc., 19 B.R. 425, 430 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982) and In rePine Tree Feed Co., 112
F. Supp. 124, 126 (D. Me. 1953). However, the Constitution provides that "[t]he Congress
shall have Power... To establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies through-
out the United States...." It does not require Congress to pass a bankruptcy law, much
less give anyone a right to invoke it. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See also United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446-47 (1973) (holding that an individual has no constitutional right to
a bankruptcy discharge, nor is the right to bankruptcy protection a fundamental right
requiring a compelling governmental interest before it may be limited).
15 Apart from the three cases discussed in the text, the law on waivers of eligibility or
the right to file for bankruptcy consists of broadly-worded, dismissive dicta. See, e.g., United
States v. Royal Business Funds Corp., 724 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983) (dicta regarding "the
general rules that a debtor may not agree to waive the right to file a bankruptcy petition,"
citing cases holding that a state court injunction or a receivership will not preclude a bank-
ruptcy filing); In rejenkins Court Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 181 B.R. 33, 35 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1995) (dicta that "restraints against filing for bankruptcy... are, of course, contrary to a
long line of authority as well as public policy," citing only In re Citade4 infra); In re Club
Tower, L.P., 138 B.R. 307, 312 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991) (dicta that agreements which pro-
hibit a borrower from filing for bankruptcy violate public policy); In re Citadel Properties,
Inc., 86 B.R. 275 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) (dicta stating, without authority, that "[t]he
Court pauses to suggest that a total prohibition against filing for bankruptcy would be
contrary to Constitutional authority as well as public policy"); In re Gulf Beach Dev. Corp.,
48 B.R. 40 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985) (dicta stating, without authority, that "the Debtor can-
not be precluded from exercising its right to file Bankruptcy and any contractual provision
to the contrary is unenforceable as a matter of law.... ."). See also Mayer, supra note 9, at 53
("That proposition is so generally assumed as common sense and horn-book law that
courts no longer cite authority for it.").
16 24 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Cal. 1938), aff'd, 100 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.), reu'd on other grounds
sub nom., Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939). At least one
other pre-Code case is relevant, if not directly on point. Relying largely on Los Angeles
Lumber, the court in In re Southern Land Title Corp., 301 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. La. 1968) held
that a stipulation entered by the debtor in one bankruptcy case, consenting to its dismissal
with prejudice, could not bar creditors from filing an involuntary petition against the
debtor because "[a]greements in derogation of the right to seek reorganization are most
strictly construed if, in fact, they are not void as contrary to public policy." 301 F. Supp. at
396. Southern Land Title cites two additional cases for this proposition, In re Sponsor Realty
Corp., 48 F. Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) and In re Hudson Coal Co., 22 F. Supp. 768 (M.D.
Pa. 1938), neither of which provides more than tangential support.
17 Los Angeles Lumber, 24 F. Supp. at 515.
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Since the passage of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, there have
been two additional cases on point In In re Tru Block Concrete Products,
Inc.,18 creditors and shareholders agreed to create a liquidating trust
to dispose of the assets of a failed corporation. If the liquidation was
not completed in five months, the creditors would be permitted to
foreclose without the firm filing for bankruptcy. When the liquida-
tion was not timely completed, the firm filed.' 9 The court declined to
dismiss the petition, citing the "well settled principal [sic] that an ad-
vance agreement to waive the benefits conferred by the bankruptcy
laws is wholly void as against public policy."20 In In re Adana Mortgage
Bankers, Inc., the Government National Mortgage. Association
("GNMA") argued that a debtor's bankruptcy filing was ineffective be-
cause it violated a contractual term requiring prior notice to GNMA of
any bankruptcy filing.2' The court rejected this argument stating, "It
is clear that' . . . an advance agreement to waive the benefits of the
(Bankruptcy) Act would be void.'" 22
Given that these two cases are separated from Los Angeles Lumber
by fifty years and a major revision of the statutory framework, it is
remarkable how similarly the three cases read. Los Angeles Lumber, Tru
Block Concrete, and Adana Mortgage each rely, for their principal sup-
port, on cases holding that an individual may not waive the right to a
bankruptcy discharge.23 The error in applying this authority to the
business context is emphasized by the Adana Mortgage court's explicit
reliance on the fresh start policy, because that policy is implicated
only in cases concerning human beings rather than legal entities. 24
18 27 B.R. 486 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1983).
19 See id. at 487.
20 Id. at 492.
21 12 B.R 989 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980), vacated as moot, 687 F.2d 344 (11th Cir. 1982).
22 Id. at 1009 (citing Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1966)).
23 Los Angeles Lumber, 24 F. Supp. at 516, relies on In re Weitzen, 3 F. Supp. 698
(S.D.N.Y. 1933) (holding an individual's agreement to waive bankruptcy discharge unen-
forceable) and Federal Nat'l Bank v. Koppel, 148 N.E. 379 (Mass. 1925) (same). Tru Block
Concrete 27 B.R. at 492, cites four cases for the proposition that waivers are against public
policy, all of which hold that an individual cannot waive rights concerning his or her bank-
ruptcy discharge: Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1966); Watrous v. George (In re
George), 15 B.R. 247 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981);Johnson v. Kriger (In re Kriger), 2 B.R. 19
(Bankr. D. Or. 1979) and Weitzen, 3 F. Supp. 698. Adana Mortgage, 12 B.R. at 1009, relies on
Fallick, Weitzen and KoppeL
24 See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND Limrrs OF BANKRUPTcy LAw 4-5, 190-92
(1986); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H.Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment
of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bank-
rupty, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 97, 110 n.45 (1984); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in
an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. Rav. 336, 341 (1993). To protect individuals' rights to a
fresh start, courts have consistently held that an individual may not waive the right to a
bankruptcy discharge. See, e.g., Kingman v. Levinson, 831 F.2d 1292, 1296 n.3 (7th Cir.
1987); Alsan Corp. v. DiPierro (In re DiPierro), 69 B.R. 279, 282 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987);
Markizer v. Economopoulos (In re Markizer), 66 B.R. 1014, 1018 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986);
Johnson v. Kriger (In re Kriger), 2 B.R. 19, 23 (Bankr. D. Or. 1979); In re Weitzen, 3 F.
19971
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The humanitarian concerns that compel us to offer a fresh start in life
to a person in financial trouble are not implicated when the bankrupt
entity is a legal fiction. Nor are the economic concerns the same. A
person must be freed from debt to have an incentive to re-enter the
economy in a productive capacity, but a business entity can cease to
function without loss to the economy if its assets are effectively
redeployed or if the very same business is continued by a new entity or
purchaser. Although business and personal bankruptcy invoke similar
concerns in some areas, it cannot be assumed, without analysis, that
bankruptcy waivers are such an area. These cases leap, without discus-
sion, from an almost unassailable proposition-that it violates funda-
mental purposes of bankruptcy law for an individual to waive the right
to a fresh start-to an entirely different one that is far less clear-that
business entities may not waive the right to file voluntary bankruptcy
petitions.
As additional support, Los Angeles Lumber and Adana Mortgage rely
on cases holding that a court, when appointing a receiver, cannot bar
corporate officers from filing a bankruptcy petition.2 5 These cases,
however, involve a legal issue far removed from contractual waivers;
their holdings are based on the Supremacy Clause and the federal
courts' exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising under a national
bankruptcy statute. 26 And it is a far cry from saying that a court may
not bar a firm from bankruptcy to saying that the firm may not volun-
tarily relinquish its right to file. The fact that the federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters does not tell us how
those courts should treat contractual bankruptcy waivers.
Thus, none of the cases on which the courts relied address the
enforceability of a contractual waiver of bankruptcy rights by a busi-
ness entity. More telling than the absence of authority, however, is
the missing analysis. Each of these cases invalidates a contractual pro-
Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1933); Federal Nat'l Bank v. Koppel, 148 N.E. 379 (Mass. 1925).
Waiver of the automatic stay may impose substantial hardship on an individual, but it does
not deny a fresh start, and courts have treated such waivers less strictly. See, e.g., In re
Powers, 170 B.R. 480 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (waiver of the automatic stay by an individual
shifts burden to opponents to show why waiver should not be given effect); In re Cheeks,
167 B.R. 817 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1994) (enforcing an individual's knowing and informed waiver
of the stay).
25 See Los Angles Lumber, 24 F. Supp. at 516 (citing Struthers Furnace Co. v. Grant, 30
F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1929) and In re American & British Mfg. Corp., 300 F. 839 (D. Conn.
1924)); Adana Mortgage, 12 B.R. at 1009 (citing Merritt v. Mt. Forest Fur Farms of Am., Inc.,
(In re Mt. Forest Fur Farms of Am., Inc.), 103 F.2d 69, 71 (6th Cir. 1939) and In re Pine
Tree Feed Co., 112 F. Supp. 124, 126 (D. Me. 1953)).
26 See Mt. Forest Farms, 103 F.2d at 71;'Struthers Furnace, 30 F.2d at 577 (citing American
& British Mfg.); Pine Tree Feed, 112 F. Supp. at 126 (citing Mt. Forest Fur Farms); American &
British Mfg., 300 F. at 847, 849-50. SeeInternational Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929)




vision on "public policy" grounds, without specifying the policies at
stake or explaining how bankruptcy waivers violate those policies. 27
Nonetheless, practitioners facing this judicial consensus generally
forego direct waivers of the right to file bankruptcy. Instead, similar
results are sought through organizational structures or contractual de-
vices that hinder the firm should it attempt to invoke the bankruptcy
laws. One method is to create an entity that is not eligible for relief
under the Bankruptcy Code. Individuals, partnerships, corporations,
and trusts that qualify as business trusts are all eligible debtors.28 In
some circumstances, a trust format may bar an entity from bank-
ruptcy. However, trusts are not viable for most commercial enter-
prises, and in many cases would still be considered business trusts
eligible for bankruptcy.29
A second method is to put provisions in the firm's organizational
documents that render it difficult for the firm to file for bankruptcy.
For example, a voluntary bankruptcy filing must be made by those
with authority to act for the firm under state law.30 A corporate char-
ter or a partnership agreement could simply bar anyone from filing a
petition, but many practitioners believe such a provision would be
held unenforceable.3 1 Instead, a provision that a bankruptcy filing
may only be made upon a unanimous or supermajority vote of share-
holders or directors may be combined with a voting proxy in favor of
one or more creditors, or with creditor representation on the board
of directors, in an attempt to effectively disable the firm from volunta-
rily filing for bankruptcy.3 2 Similarly, a partnership cannot file a vol-
untary petition without the consent of all general partners.3 3 Thus, a
27 See supra note 15.
28 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1994) provides that a "person" may be a bankruptcy debtor. "Per-
son" includes "individual, partnership and corporation, but does not include governmen-
tal unit...." 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (1994). 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) (1994) defines corporation
to include a "business trust," but the Bankruptcy Code provides no criteria for distinguish-
ing business trusts from other trusts.
29 For cases discussing the meaning of "business trust," see Shawmut Bank Conn. v.
First Fidelity Bank (In re Secured Equip. Trust of E. Air Lines, Inc.), 38 F.3d 86 (2d Cir.
1994) (trust created to facilitate a secured financing arrangement held not-to be a business
trust) and In re Tru Block Concrete Products, Inc., 27 B.R. 486 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1983)
(liquidating trust for corporation is a business trust).
30 Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100, 106 (1945); Keenihan v. Heritage Press, Inc., 19 F.3d
1255, 1258 (8th Cir. 1994); In reMinor Emergency Ctr. of Tamarac, Inc., 45 B.R. 310, 311
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985).
31 See The Tribar Opinion Committee, Opinions in the Bankruptcy Context: Rating
Agency, Structured Financing and Chapter 11 Transactions, 46 Bus. LAw. 717, 730 n.50 (1991).
32 See, e.g., Keenihan, 19 F.3d at 1258-59 (stock pledge agreement authorizing creditor
to vote stock enabled creditor to bar debtor from filing for bankruptcy); In re Minor Emer-
gency Ctr., 45 B.R. at 311-12 (bylaws requiring both directors to vote on corporate actions
rendered invalid bankruptcy filing authorized by only one director).
33 An involuntary petition may be filed by less than all of the general parmers. See 11
U.S.C. § 303(b)(3) (1994).
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structure that provides a creditor with control over a general partner-
ship interest will give that creditor power to block a voluntary filing.3 4
From the creditor's perspective, such roundabout devices are in-
ferior in several ways to an enforceable waiver of bankruptcy eligibil-
ity. First, they provide no protection against an involuntary filing by
other creditors of the firm (acting either independently or in cooper-
ation with the firm).35 Some protection against involuntary petitions
may be achieved by placing strict limitations on the firm's ability to
incur debt, but such restrictions are cumbersome, often unrealistic,
and never fully effective.3 6 Second, any exercise of authority by the
creditor to prevent a voluntary filing could raise the specter of lender
liability or equitable subordination.3 7 Finally, none of these methods
can ensure that a bankruptcy case will be dismissed without considera-
ble litigation.
Another common method of attempting to bar a firm from bank-
ruptcy is for the firm to stipulate in its agreement with the creditor
that any voluntary bankruptcy filing would be in bad faith and that
such bad faith is cause to dismiss the petition.38 Similarly, the firm
may stipulate to particular facts intended to increase the likelihood
that the bankruptcy court would grant a motion to dismiss the case or
abstain from jurisdiction.3 9 Such provisions are less valuable than an
outright waiver because they require the creditor to incur the costs
and delay of challenging the filing and provide no assurance of suc-
cess. Moreover, it appears courts will enforce these provisions, if at all,
only in the context of a workout, not as part of the initial loan
agreement. 4°
The most important development in limiting bankruptcy access
has been the rise of structured financing transactions, or asset securi-
34 See Mayer, supra note 9, at 47, for an example of such a structure.
35 For allegations of cooperative "involuntary" filings, see In re Sky Group Int'l, Inc.,
108 B.R. 86, 90 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) and In re Southern Land Title Corp., 301 F. Supp.
379, 428-30 (E.D. La. 1968).
36 Almost any firm will have some dealings with creditors other than the creditor seek-
ing the waiver, and there is no way to ensure that there will not be involuntary claimants,
such as tort victims, who could file a petition. See Mayer, supra note 9, at 44-45.
37 See id. at 48-50.
38 The court may dismiss a case for "cause," after notice and a hearing. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 707(a), 1112(b) (1994). Some courts have given effect to bad faith provisions. See, e.g.,
In re Aurora Investments, Inc., 134 B.R 982 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); In re Orange Park
South Partnership, 79 B.R 79 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987). For a discussion of these agree-
ments and a sample contractual provision, see McNicholas, supra note 9.
39 See In rejenkins Court Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 181 B.1. 33, 36 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1995) (stating that facts recited in a prepetition agreement intended to show bad faith of
any subsequent bankruptcy filing should be given little weight due to the passage of two
years since the agreement was signed).
40 See infra text accompanying note 54.
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tizations, which total in the hundreds of billions of dollars each year.41
In a structured financing, a company sells a pool of assets to an entity,
often called a special purpose vehicle or SPV, which sells to the public
securities backed by those assets. The proceeds of the securities offer-
ing are used to pay the company for the assets. SPVs are designed to
be "bankruptcy remote"-to make a bankruptcy of the SPV, voluntary
or involuntary, unlikely-and to insulate the SPV from the effects
should the company itself go into bankruptcy.42 A structured financ-
ing does not attempt to render the operating company itself ineligible
for bankruptcy; it tries to isolate the asset pool transferred to the SPV
from the risk of the company's bankruptcy.43 To the extent that the
structured financing allows a firm to protect investors from the costs
associated with a bankruptcy filing by or against the firm, the firm can
borrow from those investors at lower rates than otherwise possible. 44
Bankruptcy protections for SPVs have been largely but not entirely
successful; several SPVs have been caught up in bankruptcy proceed-
ings notwithstanding the attempted protections. 45
B. Waivers of the Automatic Stay
Given the uncertain efficacy of agreements intended to keep a
firm out of bankruptcy, creditors often seek waivers of specific bank-
ruptcy rights, most commonly the automatic stay.46 If enforced, a
waiver of the stay allows a secured creditor to foreclose on its collateral
notwithstanding the pendency of the bankruptcy case, insulating that
creditor from the costs of bankruptcy. Other rights are occasionally
waived, such as the right to seek any extension of the debtor's exclu-
41 Structured financings totalled $300 billion in 1991, $425 billion in 1992, and $480
billion in 1993. The Committee on Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization of the Asso-
ciation of the Bar of the City of NewYork, StructuredFinancing Techniques, 50 Bus. LAw. 527,
540 tbl.2 (1995) [hereinafter Structured Financing Techniques]. On structured financings
generally, see Steven L. Schwarcz, TheAlchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN.
133 (1994).
42 See Schwarcz, supra note 41, at 135-36.
43 See Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 41, at 529 ("Structured financings are
based on one central, core principal-a defined group of assets can be structurally iso-
lated, and thus serve as the basis of a financing that is independent as a legal matter, from
the bankruptcy risks of the former owner of the assets.").
44 Schwarcz, supra note 41, at 133, 151.
45 See Malcolm S. Dorris & Edward J. O'Connel, Problem Cases in Bankruptcy, in NEw
DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIZATION 453, 468-90 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. A-704 1994).
46 11 U.S.C § 362(a) (1994) provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition by or
against the firm automatically stays all acts against the debtor or the debtor's property, with
certain limited exceptions not relevant here. Thus, the automatic stay stops all litigation
against the debtor and all acts by creditors to collect their debts or foreclose on their
collateral.
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sivity period 47 or to extend the period to assume or reject a lease or
contract with the creditor.4s
Nearly all of the published cases on contractual waivers of specific
bankruptcy rights address waivers of the automatic stay granted to a
secured creditor during a prepetition workout. Several cases have en-
forced such agreements according to their terms.49 Other courts have
refused to give any effect to stay waivers, finding that they violate pub-
lic policies central to the Bankruptcy Code.50 Finally, some courts
have taken a middle position, holding that although such waivers are
not enforceable per se, they are entitled to some weight in consider-
ing a motion by the creditor to lift the stay5' or to dismiss the case 52
for "cause."53
Courts that enforce these waivers rely heavily on the public policy
of encouraging out-of-court restructurings,54 reasoning that nonjudi-
cial resolutions are less expensive for the parties and less burdensome
on the courts.55 Moreover, once the firm has obtained the benefits of
the agreement, through an extension of additional time or money, it
Would be unfair for the court to deprive the creditor of the protection
47 Under 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1994), the debtor has the exclusive right to file a plan
of reorganization during the first 120 days of the bankruptcy proceeding. Section 1121 (d)
provides that this period may be increased or reduced by the court for cause. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1121(d) (1994).
48 Under 11 U.S.C. § 365(d), a trustee generally has 60 days to assume or reject an
unexpired lease or executory contract in a liquidation case before "such contract or lease is
deemed rejected"; but, in a reorganization case, a debtor may assume or reject such a
contract or lease at any time up until confirmation of a plan of reorganization (except for
leases of nonresidential real property, which must be assumed or rejected within 60 days in
order not to be deemed rejected). The 60 day period may be extended by the court for
cause.
49 In re Hudson Manor Parmers, Ltd., 28 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 221 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1991); In re Club Tower L.P., 138 B.R. 307 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991); In re Citadel
Properties, Inc., 86 B.R. 275 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
.o Farm Credit of Cent. Fla., ACA v. Polk, 160 B.R. 870 (M.D. Fla. 1993); In re Sky
Group Int'l, Inc., 108 B.R. 86 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989); cf. In re Best Finance Corp., 74 B.R.
243 (Bankr. D. P.R. 1987) (refusing to honor postpetition waiver). For an argument that
waivers of the automatic stay should not be enforceable, see William Bassin, Why Courts
Should Refuse to Enforce Pre-Petition Agreements that Waive Bankruptcy's Automatic Stay Provision,
28 IND. L. REv. 1 (1994).
51 See In re McBride Estates, Ltd., 154 B.R. 339 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1993) (absent show-
ing of changed circumstances, waiver is "cause" to lift automatic stay; sanctioning debtor
and its counsel for unjustifiably contesting creditor's motion to lift the stay).
52 See In re Growers Properties No. 56 Ltd., 117 B.R 1015, 1020 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1990) (granting motion to dismiss for bad-faith filing and lifting the stay "for cause.").
53 11 U.S.C. § 362 (d) (1) (1994) allows the court to modify or terminate the automatic
stay "for cause." Sections 707(a) and 1112(b) permit the court to dismiss a case "for
cause," in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases, respectively. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(a), 1112(b)
(1994).
54 See In re Cheeks, 167 B.R. 817, 819 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1994); In re Powers, 170 B.R. 480,
483 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (citing Cheeks); In reClub Tower L.P., 138 B.R. 307, 312 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1991).
55 See Club Tower, 138 B.R. at 312.
CONTRACTUAL BANKRUPTCY
from bankruptcy that it bargained for.56 Finally, these courts note
that a waiver of the stay is not equivalent to a waiver of the right to file
bankruptcy because it leaves all other bankruptcy rights in place.57
Courts refusing to enforce the stay generally reason that the stay
protects notjust the firm but all of its creditors, and that the firm lacks
the power to waive the rights of its creditors.58 Moreover, waiver of
the stay threatens the firm's ability to conduct an orderly liquidation
or reorganization-central goals of bankruptcy law.59
C. Bankruptcy Disincentives
Given the uncertainties inherent in more direct waivers, creditors
often insist on indirect leverage that will help protect them against a
bankruptcy filing. The most common forms of indirect leverage are
"springing" or "exploding" guaranties 60 and standby letters of credit.
These arrangements impose liability on the principals of a firm if it
goes into bankruptcy. Thus, a lender making a nonrecourse loan to a
real estate limited partnership may require a guaranty from the gen-
eral partners holding them personally liable for the mortgage debt if
the partnership ever files a voluntary bankruptcy proceeding or be-
comes the subject of an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding that is not
dismissed within ninety days of its commencement.61 Alternatively,
the lender may require a letter of credit that can be drawn in the
event of a bankruptcy filing. The firm's principals are then obligated,
or their assets pledged, to reimburse the issuing bank.
Bankruptcy courts have not directly addressed the validity of
springing and exploding guaranties. However, the courts sometimes
temporarily enjoin actions against third parties if those actions
threaten irreparable harm to the debtor.62 A court concerned that a
springing or exploding guaranty threatens the debtor's reorganiza-
56 Cf. In re Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. 1014, 1022-23 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (noting
benefits derived by debtor from out-of-court workout).
57 Club Tower, 138 B.R. at 311-12. But see In reJenkins Court Assocs. Ltd. Partnership,
181 B.R. 33, 36-7 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (refusing to enforce waiver of the automatic stay
in a single-asset real estate case, because in such a case waiver of stay may be equivalent to
waiving the right to bankruptcy protection entirely).
58 Farm Credit of Cent. Fla., ACA v. Polk, 160 B.R. 870, 873-74 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1993); In re Sky Group Int'l, Inc., 108 B.R. 86, 88-89 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989).
59 Jenkins Cour4 181 B.R. at 37; Farm Credit; 160 B.R. at 873-74; Sky Group, 108 B.R. at
89.
60 A springing guaranty is one that "springs" into existence upon the happening of a
specified event-an express condition precedent. An "exploding" guaranty is one that
terminates upon the happening of a specified event.
61 For a sample exploding guaranty agreement, see MADISON ET AL., supra note 9, at
F12-41.
62 See, e.g., Wysko Inv. Co. v. Great Am. Bank, 131 B.R. 146 (D. Ariz. 1991) (enjoining
creditor from drawing on a letter of credit on which a debtor's principal was the account
party); Lahman Mfg. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Lahman Mfg. Co.), 33 B.R. 681 (Bankr.
D.S.D. 1983); First Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Pettit, 12 B.R. 147 (E.D. Ark. 1981).
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tion might enjoin enforcement of the guaranty while the bankruptcy
is pending.63 And although a bankruptcy court may not permanently
relieve a nondebtor of its liabilities absent extraordinary circum-
stances, 64 it is interesting to ponder whether some bankruptcy judges
might view a bankruptcy-triggered guaranty as just such an extraordi-
nary circumstance. Standby letters of credit have been tested, and
although the law has sometimes wavered, 65 they are generally effective
despite a bankruptcy filing.66
If disincentives succeed in their objective, they leave little or no
trace in the law records. Debtors who "go gentle into that good
night"67 rather than file for bankruptcy do not show up in the case
books or bankruptcy statistics. Thus, it is impossible to say to what
extent such disincentives are currently keeping firms from
bankruptcy.
D. Conclusion
Courts have been ambivalent in their response to bankruptcy
waivers. There is a general agreement that neither bankruptcy eligi-
bility nor the right to file for bankruptcy may be waived. However,
partial restraints, such as restrictions in a firm's charter, may be used
to create hurdles on the road to bankruptcy. Less sweeping waivers,
such as waivers of the automatic stay or admissions that any filing
63 See First Fed. Say. & Loan, 12 B.R 147 (enjoining mortgagee's action against
debtor's parents because it might place undue pressure on the debtor and thus affect
reorganization).
64 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (1994) provides that a bankruptcy discharge does not discharge
the obligation of any nondebtor. Numerous courts have construed this as barring bank-
ruptcy plans from modifying the obligations of guarantors or other third parties. See Un-
derhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1985); Union Carbide Corp. v. Newboles, 686 F.2d
593 (7th Cir. 1982); R.I.D.C. Indus. Devel. Fund v. Snyder, 539 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1095 (1977). Other courts have upheld permanent injunctions pro-
tecting third parties from liability, given extraordinary circumstances-generally mass-tort
bankruptcies. See Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989); MacArthur Co. v.Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d 89
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 868 (1988). For a discussion of the issues raised by bank-
ruptcy court involvement in a dispute between two nondebtors, such as a creditor and a
guarantor of the debtor's obligations, see Howard C. Buschman III & Sean P. Madden, The
Power and Propriety of Bankruptcy Court Intervention in Actions Between Nondebtors, 47 Bus. LAw.
913 (1992).
65 In reDelaware River Stevedores, Inc., 129 B.R. 38 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (invoking
conditional stay on letter of credit); Wysko Inv. Co., 31 B.R. 146 (same); Twist Cap Inc. v.
Southeast Bank (In re Twist Cap, Inc.), 1 B.R. 284 (Bankr. D. Fla. 1979) (same).
66 See, e.g., First Fidelity Bank v. Prime Motor Inns, Inc. (In re Prime Motor Inns, Inc.),
130 B.R. 610 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (reversing bankruptcy court order that indenture trustee
return proceeds of a letter of credit); Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Security Pac. Nat'l Trust Co. (In
re Zenith Labs., Inc.), 104 B.R. 667 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989) (collecting on letter of credit
permissible and not in bad faith); Page v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Page), 18 B.R. 713 (D.D.C.
1982) (no showing that an injunction prohibiting cashing of letter of credit would aid tax
preparation of a successful plan).
67 DYLA THoMAs, COLLEcTED PoEMs 128 (1957).
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should be deemed to be in bad faith, have engendered a mixed re-
sponse. And indirect restrictions on the use of bankruptcy through
leverage on principals, if properly structured, are generally effective
but not beyond challenge. The existence of so many partially effective
"half-way" measures raises the question of whether more consistent
and appropriate results would be obtained by eliminating the general
prohibition on bankruptcy waivers.68 The answer to this question re-
quires an examination of the purposes of bankruptcy and the provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Code.
II
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND BANKRupTCy WAVERS
A. Waivers and the Economic Theory of Bankruptcy
It has become common in the bankruptcy literature for propo-
nents of a law and economics approach to suggest that firms should
be permitted to waive their bankruptcy rights. The most thorough
suggestion along these lines was made by Robert Rasmussen, who pro-
poses that bankruptcy law be amended to permit firms to specify in
their organizational documents which of a "menu" of choices will be
used to resolve the failure of the firm. This "menu" includes bank-
ruptcy reorganization, bankruptcy liquidation, a "contingent equity"
option, or state law processes. 69 According to Rasmussen, this regime
would permit firms and their creditors to select the most effective mix
of creditor rights and remedies given the particulars of the firm.70
Although Rasmussen has perhaps fleshed out this idea most thor-
oughly, other prominent bankruptcy scholars, including Douglas
Baird, James Bowers, and Alan Schwartz, have also addressed it.71
The economic models focus on the role of bankruptcy law in es-
tablishing efficient contracts among firms and their creditors, and
they often begin with the observation that bankruptcy solves a collec-
tive action problem for the firm's creditors. Outside of bankruptcy,
creditors have rights against the firm and its assets to collect their
debts. Under this nonbankruptcy "grab law," the first creditor to stake
a claim to an asset belonging to the firm is entitled to be paid out of
68 The alternative, rendering all of these methods entirely ineffective, is probably im-
possible because the lines between bankruptcy avoidance techniques and the ordinary and
necessary tools of commerce are too fine. For example, to eliminate springing guaranties,
would all guaranties be barred? If not, would a guaranty become unenforceable if the
creditor offered to waive it in exchange for a deed in lieu of foreclosure that is not chal-
lenged by a bankruptcy case? As to charter provisions restricting the ability to file bank-
ruptcy, would creditor representation on the board be barred? Or would filing be
permitted even without authorization under state law, thus opening the possibility of a
filing by one officer against the directions of the board?
69 See Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 100-07.
70 See id.
71 See articles cited supra note 4.
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that asset. Upon default, secured creditors foreclose on their collat-
eral, applying the proceeds to their debts. Unsecured creditors bring
suit, secure judgment liens and levy on assets, subject only to prior
liens on those assets. One result of this "grab law" is a "race to the
courthouse": creditors may expend time, money, and effort to be the
first to secure a claim to a particular asset, resulting in overinvestment
in monitoring the firm's financial condition, wasteful litigation, and
high collection costs.7 2 Moreover, selling assets in this piecemeal fash-
ion sacrifices any value that the firm may have as a going concern in
excess of the value of its assets sold individually.73
The result is that by attempting to maximize their individual re-
coveries, creditors as a group recover less than if they could coordi-
nate their efforts and hold a single, collective proceeding in which the
firm's assets are sold in a manner that maximizes proceeds and mini-
mizes costs. However, there is no way for a diverse and constantly
changing body of creditors to negotiate such an agreement.74 To re-
solve this common-pool problem, bankruptcy law attempts to bind
each individual creditor with restrictions that maximize the recovery
of the creditors as a group and impose an agreement (the hypotheti-
cal "creditors' bargain") which would be negotiated ex ante by profit
maximizing creditors aware of the costs and benefits of bankruptcy
and state law rights.75 The firm benefits from this agreement, because
if collectivization enhances creditors' recoveries upon the firm's insol-
72 See Thomas H.Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors'Bar-
gain, 91 YALE LJ. 857, 866 (1982).
73 SeeJackson, supra note 72, at 864-65. "Going concern value" refers to the excess of
the value of the assets in reorganization over their value in liquidation. Where appropri-
ate, distinction must be made between value that can be realized upon piecemeal liquida-
tion through state court proceedings and the value that can be realized through a
bankruptcy liquidation, which might include sale of the assets to a third party as a going
concern. SeeJAcKsON, supra note 24, at 14-15.
74 SeeJackson, supra note 72, at 866-67.
75 The creditors' bargain model attempts to provide a normative basis for bankruptcy
law by viewing it as a hypothetical consensual agreement among creditors. The model was
originally proposed by Thomas H. Jackson. See Jackson, supra note 72. The model was
substantially revised byJackson and Robert E. Scott See Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E.
Scott, On The Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain,
75 VA. L. Rxv. 155 (1989).
316 [Vol. 82:301
1997] CONTRACTUAL BANKRUPTCY
vency or otherwise reduces credit costs,76 the firm will be able to bor-
row at lower rates.77
If bankruptcy is the solution to a collective action problem, it is
often assumed that the bankruptcy system must be mandatory and un-
waivable for all parties.7 8 However, a full formulation of the creditors'
bargain in a world where bankruptcy is costly but available would spec-
ify that the use and provisions of bankruptcy law be waivable.
Consider the result if bankruptcy rights may be waived by the
firm, but not by any creditor without the consent of the firm. If the
economic explanation of bankruptcy is correct, rational, profit maxi-
mizing firms generally would not waive these rights because waivers
would increase their overall cost of capital. Creditors,7 9 aware that
they have lost the benefits of an efficient collection mechanism in the
event of insolvency, would increase the aggregate interest rate they
charge or reduce their lending.
However, bankruptcy may be a losing proposition for some
firms-meaning that it would result in administrative, managerial,
and monitoring costs greater than the combination of going concern
value that would be preserved, enforcement and monitoring costs that
would be avoided, and other gains creditors obtain from bank-
76 Collectivizing the debt collection process may benefit creditors in three basic ways:
it may reduce the total cost of debt collection from insolvent firms by allowing one collec-
tive proceeding rather than many individual ones; it may provide mechanisms (such as
preference and fraudulent conveyance law) that reduce "eve-of-bankruptcy" strategic be-
havior, by the firm or creditors, which prejudices the interests of the creditors as a whole;
and it may preserve the going concern value of the firm, if any. See Warren, supra note 24,
at 346-52. Jackson and Scott suggest another possible benefit-a modification of the credi-
tors' bargain that attempts to explain why creditors might agree to reallocate value in bank-
ruptcy relative to nonbankruptcy entitlements. Jackson & Scott, supra note 75. They
propose that risk averse creditors who are unable to fully diversify their investments may
find it efficient to share certain risks that are outside the control of the parties. This modi-
fication of the creditors' bargain has been criticized. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy
and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 439, 484-87 (1992) (arguing that risk sharing can be
achieved more effectively through contract negotiations outside of bankruptcy).
77 See Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 55-68; Jackson, supra note 72, at 861 n.21 (noting
that the allocation of savings between the firm and its creditors will depend on the "elastici-
ties of the supply of and demand for credit").
78 See Bassin, supra note 50, at 10-11 ("Permitting parties to contract for relief from
stay prior to bankruptcy, without court approval, would allow creditors to circumvent the
bankruptcy judge's role of protecting creditors as a whole from consuming the debtor's
assets to their own detriment."); see also Mayer, supra note 9, at n.87.
79 If bankruptcy actually provides net benefits to shareholders (through the impair-
ment of creditors' rights and the violation of absolute priority) rather than creditors, then
shareholders rather than creditors will adjust their required yield. That is, a waiver will
reduce the price of the firm's stock. Thus, the costs of the waiver will be directly factored
into the calculations of managers that seek to maximize shareholder value. The end result
is the same.
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ruptcy.8 0 In these cases, creditors would expect to fare better if bank-
ruptcy fights were waived, and would lend to a firm on better
aggregate terms if the firm could assure them that they would be
spared the costs of bankruptcy. Firms would waive their bankruptcy
rights only if the costs imposed by exercise of those rights are ex-
pected to exceed the benefits generated by them.81 Thus, waivers may
be a means of sorting, in advance, whether a firm's creditors are likely
to benefit from the mechanisms offered by bankruptcy law.8 2 Of
course, this depends on firms and creditors being able to predict
whether bankruptcy is likely to be beneficial or detrimental, but there
is reason to believe this is possible.8 3
Moreover, as the variety of devices used in current practice dem-
onstrates, waiver is not an all or nothing proposition. A firm may
agree to waive specific bankruptcy rights that are expected to impose
costs greater than the benefits they offer.84 A firm and its creditors
could determine whether various components of the bankruptcy sys-
tem are efficient, given the nature of the firm's assets, business, and
management.85 Thus, a firm might choose to waive its right to reor-
ganize while maintaining its right to use bankruptcy law to effect a
80 See James W. Bowers, Rehabilitation, Redistribution or Dissipation: The Evidence For
Choosing Among Bankruptcy Hypotheses, 72 WAsH. U. L.Q. 955, 967 n.55 (1994) (noting the
possibility that the bankruptcy system has reduced the amount of available secured credit).
81 In fact, there is reason to believe that some firms would even eschew efficient bank-
ruptcy waivers. See infra Part IV.B.
82 Jackson and Scott suggest that one reason for bankruptcy reorganization is to pre-
serve the idiosyncratic value that some owners attach to a firm, in excess of its market
value. In exchange for the right to preserve an interest in the firm in the event of insol-
vency, such owners will pay a premium to creditors. In suggesting that bankruptcy serves as
such mandatory insurance, they note that it is impossible for bankruptcy to distinguish
between equity holders with such idiosyncratic preferences, and equity holders who merely
claim such preferences for strategic reasons. Jackson & Scott, supra note 75, at 175. En-
forceable bankruptcy waivers would provide a solution to this sorting problem by allowing
equity holders without such preferences to waive their right to reorganization. Something
approximating this type of waiver may be accomplished by partnerships and closely held
firms, indirectly, by pledging the ownership interests to a creditor. However, this does not
eliminate the costs of the bankruptcy case; it just transfers the role of equity to one creditor
out of many.
83 See infra Part III.B.
84 Cf Baird, supra note 4, at 144:
If they could have bargained together before investing in the firm, each
investor would have been willing to pay for additional procedures to pro-
tect its interests only until the cost of the uncertainty eliminated by addi-
tionai procedure was less than the cost of the procedures designed to
eliminate it. Procedures can be too extensive or too limited.
85 For example, Mark Roe suggests that bankruptcy sharing may be undesirable if one
purpose of secured financing is to provide a signal of confidence in the venture to the
secured creditor. MarkJ. Roe, Commentary on "On The Nature Of Bankruptcy".. Bankruptcy,
Priority, and Economics, 75 VA. L. Rnv. 219, 222 (1989). For an interesting view on why the
bankruptcy laws might incorporate inefficient provisions, see F. H. Buckley, The American
Stay, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLiNARY L. J. 738, 761-778 (1994) (evaluating interest-group and
sociological theories for why the United States adopted the automatic stay, concluding that
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liquidation more efficiently than under state law.86 Or, if it is efficient
to insulate a particular secured creditor from the costs of bank-
ruptcy,87 the firm might waive the automatic stay as to that secured
creditor and its collateral.88 Waiver of the automatic stay may have
advantages for the creditors as a whole, compared with a waiver of
bankruptcy eligibility. Such a waiver does not negate the preference
or fraudulent conveyance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, which
protect creditors from strategic behavior by firms on the verge of
bankruptcy.8 9 It does not prohibit reorganization if reorganization is
feasible without the secured creditor's collateral. 90 Even if the collat-
eral is necessary for a reorganization, waiver does not preclude reor-
ganization because the creditor may agree not to foreclose in
exchange for a share of the excess value created by reorganization. 9 1
the most plausible explanation was the desire of the federal judiciary to enhance its pres-
tige by luring railroad receivership cases from state to federal court).
86 11 U.S.C. § 706(a) (1994) specifically states that a waiver of the right to convert a
liquidation case to a reorganization case is unenforceable. See supra notes 11, 13.
87 George Triantis has suggested that purchase-money security interests might, in
some cases, be explained by the presumption that the goods are worth more to the pur-
chaser than to the seller at the time of sale, but upon default may be worth more to the
seller because the seller's specialized knowledge of resale markets allows the seller to rede-
ploy the assets to their best use. See George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of
Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1992); see alsoJames W. Bowers, Groping and
Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Fail-
ure, 88 Micat. L. REv. 2097, 2140-41 (1990) (security interest may be given to creditor where
creditor is most efficient liquidator of the asset, and asset may be left unencumbered where
firm is better liquidator). Combined with the costs experienced by sellers forced to partici-
pate in bankruptcy in order to repossess, this explains why some firms and creditors would
negotiate stay waivers.
88 The argument that automatic stay waivers are unenforceable "ipso facto" clauses
was properly rejected in In re Powers, 170 B.R. 480, 482-83 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994). Under
11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (1994), a "right or obligation under [an executory contract] or
[unexpired lease] may not be terminated or modified.., solely because of a provision"
regarding insolvency or bankruptcy. However, this does not cover a waiver, which provides
that the contract's ordinary terms be enforced despite bankruptcy.
89 See In re Club Tower L.P., 138 B.R. 307, 311-312 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991).
90 Liquidation and reorganization are points on a spectrum, rather than absolutes,
because even reorganizing corporations typically sell off some assets. See Lynn M. LoPucki
& William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Compa-
nies, 78 CoRNoLL L. REv. 597, 604-606 (1993). If certain assets could be identified in ad-
vance as candidates for sale upon insolvency, stay waivers might bejustified for such assets.
91 See infra text accompanying notes 149-50. Such transactions within bankruptcy may
correct inaccurate ex ante estimates of the costs and benefits of bankruptcy, although bilat-
eral monopoly problems might also prevent some efficient postpetition negotiations from
succeeding. Douglas Baird and Randal Picker used game theory to model negotiations
between management of a closely-held firm and a secured creditor with a lien on all of the
firm's assets, suggesting that exempting this primary creditor from the automatic stay
(while continuing to stay actions by other creditors) might enhance bargaining between
the parties. See Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining
Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20J. LEGAL SrUD. 311 (1991).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
In essence, waivable bankruptcy rights would give firms a choice
of insolvency regimes.92 Firms could determine whether their costs of
capital would be lower if their creditors have access to collective reor-
ganization proceedings, collective liquidation proceedings, or are rel-
egated to their individual state-law entitlements.93 This waiver
scenario is distinct from the situation posed in the original creditors'
bargain hypothetical, where creditors find themselves unable to nego-
tiate to a bankruptcy system in a world without one. The bankruptcy
system exists and is readily available. 94 Once such a system exists, the
firm can act as a broker which, to lower its own costs, will consider
whether or not the creditors' collective interests are served by such a
system.9 5 If bankruptcy rights cannot be waived, then we have re-
placed one hold-out problem-collective proceedings in a world with-
out bankruptcy law depend on unanimous consent-with another:
even if bankruptcy imposes greater costs than benefits, it cannot be
waived without the unanimous consent of creditors and the firm. A
single creditor 96 that sees an advantage for itself in invoking bank-
ruptcy can take the rest along for the ride.97
This economic analysis indicates that waivers may be beneficial if
the primary purpose of bankruptcy law is to maximize the recovery of
creditors when a firm becomes insolvent, thereby minimizing the
firm's cost of capital.98 Critics generally do not dispute that enhanc-
ing creditor recoveries is a primary purpose of many provisions of the
bankruptcy law.99 However, they take exception to enthroning credi-
92 Of course, the choice need not be infinite. Transaction costs may argue for al-
lowing only a restricted number of types of waivers. SeeJackson & Scott, supra note 75, at
202-03; Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 100 n.210. It seems likely that only a limited number of
standard waivers would be used widely, including waivers of bankruptcy eligibility, waivers
of reorganization rights, and waivers of the automatic stay.
93 See Bowers, supra note 80.
94 It might seem that the firm, as the hub of contractual relationships with its credi-
tors, could as easily create bankruptcy law as opt out, thus invalidating a basic premise of
the creditors' bargain model-the need for a noncontractual bankruptcy system to over-
come transaction costs that prevent its contractual establishment. However, in addition to
the holdout problem, the complexity of the bankruptcy law probably renders it impossible
of creation through direct negotiation, and bankruptcy relies on the existence of a public
infrastructure (bankruptcy courts, the United States Trustees, and so forth) that would
likely bar the private creation of bankruptcy law.
95 Bowers, supra note 80, at 214042.
96 This may be a slight overstatement, because it takes three creditors with unsecured
claims totalling $5,000 to file an involuntary petition against a firm with more than 12
creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1994). The basic point stands, however.
97 Professor Warren suggests that one of the advantages of our bankruptcy system is
that by relying on private parties to institute the proceedings, we avoid imposing bank-
ruptcy costs on those who see no benefit in its use. Warren, supra note 24, at 369. This
overlooks the holdout problem.
98 SeeJackson, supra note 72, at 861, 869-70; Robert K. Rasmussen, AnEssay on Optimal
Bankruptcy Rules and SocialJustie, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 18-19.
99 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 24, at 344.
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tor wealth-maximization as the sole goal, arguing that other policies
should, and do, play a legitimate role in bankruptcy law, and that an
agreement among creditors that ignores the interests of employees,
customers, and the community at large cannot provide an adequate
normative basis for bankruptcy. 00 For reasons addressed below,' 0 ' I
do not believe that this dispute must be resolved to establish overall'
standards for the treatment of waivers under the current law. Thus, I
will continue to examine the implications of waivers in the context of
maximizing value for the firm and its creditors. Part III.C will ex-
amine the extent to which other policies embodied in the Bankruptcy
Code modify these implications.
B. Administrative Costs and the Efficiency of Bankruptcy
The simple model presented in the preceding section suggests
that waivers may be a rational and beneficial response to a bankruptcy
system whose costs sometimes outweigh its benefits. As a first check of
this idea, it is worth asking whether the costs imposed by bankruptcy
are large enough to provoke such a response. This is an empirical
question for which final answers are not available, but the existing
data offer some guidance. 0 2
Bankruptcy reorganization costs may indeed be high enough to
render it inefficient to reorganize many firms with going concern
value, particularly smaller firms.' 03 Estimates of the direct (legal and
administrative) costs of reorganization for large firms are compara-
tively modest, although not insignificant. 0 4 In smaller cases, however,
100 See id. at 852-60.
10, See infra Part HI.C.
102 The empirical data discussed in the text cannot prove, with certainty, whether or
when bankruptcy is efficient, either for the parties to the case or for the public interest.
Nor is the economic reasoning presented here free from challenge. However, courts are
currently faced with the dilemma of enforcing or declining to enforce waivers; they cannot
wait for final proof but must act daily on the basis of the best available information. This
Article suggests that, on the basis of the available evidence, there are strong reasons to
suppose that many waivers should be enforced in order to better carry out the purposes of
bankruptcy. At the very least, those who support the status quo should be compelled to
present affirmative arguments for the existing hostility to waivers, rather than rely on un-
reasoned and generally inapposite precedent.
103 SeeJAcKsoN, supra note 24, at 215-24; Baird, supra note 4 (suggesting that the costs
of corporate reorganization may outweigh its benefits).
104 See Adler, supra note 76, at 465 n.107 (citing estimates of the direct costs of reor-
ganization that range from 3% to 25% of the firm's value); Edward I. Altman, A Further
Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39J. FIN. 1067, 1078 (1984) (finding
direct costs of 6.2% of asset value); Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and
Vwlation of Priority of Claims, 27J. FIN. EcoN. 285, 289 (1990) (study of public companies
reporting that the "direct costs of bankruptcy are 20.6% of the market value of equity,...
8.1% of book value of debt plus the market value of equity,... and 2.8% of the book value
of total assets.... ").
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costs may be quite substantial.105 A recent, albeit limited, study of
small business bankruptcies found that over twenty percent of the dis-
tributions in Chapter 11 cases were paid to professionals, and that
other direct costs amounted to almost six percent of distributions. 0 6
Although empirical data is indispensable, it runs the risk of dis-
counting what cannot be measured. Estimates generally ignore the
indirect costs of bankruptcy reorganization even though they may
often exceed the direct costs.' 0 7 A primary indirect cost is the loss of
value caused by management distraction during the bankruptcy
case.' 08 Further losses may be caused by employees and suppliers who
react to the bankruptcy proceeding by reducing their investment in
activities that will have value only if the firm continues to exist.10 9 Cus-
tomers may turn from the firm out of warranty concerns or to develop
more reliable suppliers in case the firm fails." 0 These indirect costs
of bankruptcy are extremely difficult to measure but are likely signifi-
cant. For example, one of the few studies to attempt to quantify indi-
rect costs estimated them at 10.5% or more of the firms'
prebankruptcy value, compared with direct costs of 6.2%. 111
Another cost that is generally absent from the quantitative studies
is the time value of money. If it takes two years of bankruptcy to real-
ize a gain for creditors, then the value of the bankruptcy distributions
must be discounted for the delay." 2 Under the Bankruptcy Code,
105 See Robert M. Lawless et al., A Glimpse at Professional Fees and Other Direct Costs in
Small Firm Bankruptcies, 1994 U. IL.. L. Ray. 847, 870.
106 See id. at 851. This study excluded, for both theoretical and practical reasons, distri-
butions to secured creditors. Thus, bankruptcy costs are measured against distributions to
unsecured creditors, for whose benefit bankruptcy supposedly is designed. See id. at 860-62.
The study used data on 30 Chapter 7 cases and 27 Chapter 11 cases, eliminating from the
original universe of 75 cases 18 no-asset Chapter 7 cases. From the remaining 57 cases, the
authors eliminated nine Chapter 7 cases and five Chapter 11 cases in which total secured
debt exceeded total assets. These are the cases that probably have the leastjustification for
being in bankruptcy, and if these cases had been included in the database (as they must be
in firms' and creditors' expectations about bankruptcy), they presumably would have in-
creased the estimates of bankruptcy cost relative to its benefits.
107 See, e.g., MichelleJ. White, Bankruptcy Costs and the New Bankruptcy Code, 38J. FIN.
477, 486 (1983) ("[lit is impossible to infer from data on bankruptcy transactions costs
[direct costs] alone whether total bankruptcy costs are high or low, since the former are
only a very small part of the latter.").
108 See Adler, supra note 76, at 465; Weiss, supra note 104, at 289.
109 See Adler, supra note 76, at 465-67; Weiss, supra note 104, at 289.
110 See Weiss, supra note 104, at 288.
111 SeeAltman, supra note 104, at 1078.
112 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble With Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 729, 740-44
(LoPucki cites several studies on the duration of bankruptcy cases and concludes that the
duration of bankruptcy cases has significantly increased under the 1978 Code. The me-
dian time for confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan was found by one recent study to be 17.5
months, and by another to be 21.6 months. Earlier studies had shown times ranging from
9.5 months and 12 months. For large public companies, figures ranged from 16 months to
32 months.).
CONTRACTUAL BANKRUPTCY
however, unsecured and undersecured creditors are denied interest
on their claims, thus formalizing a substantial distortion in measuring
bankruptcy costs.
Bankruptcy reorganization also imposes direct costs on creditors
which are not included in these estimates. For example, a secured
creditor may incur substantial expenses in managerial attention and
legal fees, protecting its lien rights, securing "adequate protection,"
monitoring the debtor, contesting the valuation of collateral and the
appropriate interest rate in any proposed "cramdown" plan, partici-
pating in plan negotiations, and even proposing its own plan. Even an
unsecured creditor that chooses to remain relatively inactive in the
bankruptcy case may incur costs in filing a proof of claim, seeking
legal advice on the effects of bankruptcy, and attempting to evaluate a
plan and disclosure statement.
As has often been noted, these costs may induce inefficient rent-
seeking behavior because they are not borne equally by all involved in
the bankruptcy process. 113 Assuming that the firm is insolvent, equity
holders lose nothing when the firm incurs these costs by filing for
bankruptcy." 4 The costs of the bankruptcy process are borne by cred-
itors either directly or through reduced recoveries from the bank-
ruptcy estate. Many of these costs are at least partly within the control
of the firm's management, which may expedite or delay the case, giv-
ing management bargaining leverage with which to extract value for
equity holders from creditors. 115 Other provisions of bankruptcy law
113 See infra notes 115-17.
114 This does not mean that the costs are not borne by equity holders overall. These
indirect costs will result in higher interest rates demanded by creditors in anticipation of
losses imposed by bankruptcy rules. However, equity holders do not bear the marginal
cost of deciding to file a case, and thus they do not weigh those costs against their potential
gains from filing.
115 Indirect evidence of this is provided by Allan C. Eberhart et al., Security Pridng And
Deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45 J. FIN. 1457 (1990),
which found that the bankruptcy proceedings are shorter where shareholders receive
greater deviations from their absolute priority entitlements-in other words, creditors ap-
parently can shorten the stay in bankruptcy by purchasing peace with equity holders. Stud-
ies of Chapter 11 reorganizations consistently show meaningful deviations from absolute
priority. See, e.g., Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, An Empirical Investigation of U.S.
Firms In Reorganization, 44J. FiN. 747 (1989) (finding that 21 of 27 firms showed deviations
from absolute priority, averaging 7.6% of firm assets, and noting that payments to share-
holders can be viewed as the purchase by creditors of the shareholders' option to delay
reorganization); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining OverEquity's Share in
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. R v. 125, 176
(1990); Weiss, supra note 104 (indicating that 29 of 37 firms showed deviations from abso-
lute priority). Where principals are obligated for firm debt, reallocation may also occur
outside of the bankruptcy case, through a release by the creditor of a guaranty or other
liability owed by a principal of the debtor. Thus, estimates of the reallocation based solely
on assets within the bankruptcy case may miss part of the benefit realized by equity
holders.
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may also redistribute value away from creditors to equity holders, even
when creditors are not paid in full." 6
To the extent that equity holders, through management, can af-
fect the costs of the proceeding or otherwise reallocate value away
from senior claimants relative to their nonbankruptcy rights, they
have a reason to file for reorganization however unlikely reorganiza-
tion may be. 117 An examination of the results of Chapter 11 filings
lends credence to the suggestion that unwarranted reorganization
cases are often filed. Only about seventeen percent of filed Chapter
11 cases result in confirmed plans, and many of these confirmed plans
are not successfully consummated. 118 While not conclusive proof,
these numbers suggest that many reorganization efforts are not justi-
fied and would be better handled under Chapter 7 liquidation or state
law.119
Not only is there reason to question the value of many bank-
ruptcy reorganization cases, but there is reason to question the effi-
ciency of bankruptcy liquidation relative to winding-up insolvent firms
under state law.120 Studies indicate that unsecured creditors receive
116 For a discussion of the numerous methods by which bankruptcy debtors may co-
erce a redistribution from creditors to equity holders, see Adler, supra note 76, at 447-55;
Baird & Picker, supra note 91, passim Lucian A. Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, Bargaining
and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization, 8 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 253 (1992).
117 The possibility of reallocation is an incentive to file for bankruptcy in both effi-
cient and inefficient circumstances. See Randal C. Picker, Voluntay Petitions and the Credi-
tors'Bargain, 61 U. CIN. L. Rav. 519, 536 (1992) (finding that violation of absolute priority
is an inducement for debtor to file bankruptcy where bankruptcy is efficient, and it thus
mitigates the agency problem caused by the divergence of shareholder and creditor
interests).
118 For example, one of the few studies compiling data on plan confirmation reported
that of 260 Chapter 11 cases filed in Poughkeepsie, N.Y. from 1980 to 1989, 45 resulted in
confirmed plans. Nine of these plans provided for liquidation of the debtor. Of the re-
maining 36 plans calling for continuation of the debtor as an operating company, only 17
are believed to have been consummated. Thus, only 6.5% of Chapter 11 cases resulted in
an ongoing reorganized firm, and only 38% of the cases in which plans were actually con-
firmed did so. See Susan Jensen-Conklin, Do Confirmed Chapter 11 Plans Consummate? The
Results of a Study and Analysis of the Law, 97 COM. Lj. 297, 316-30 (1992). Jensen-Conklin
indicates that these results are in line with those of a larger national study. See id. at 317. It
should be noted that larger firms are much more likely to confirm reorganization plans.
Thus, LoPucki and Whitford show that for the 43 largest cases filed between 1979 and
1988, roughly 90% confirmed plans. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 115, at 137-41.
119 Warren properly cautions against drawing too strong an inference from these
numbers which necessarily do not capture many of the potential benefits of "failed" Chap-
ter 11 proceedings, such as the possibility that the bankruptcy allowed preferences or
fraudulent conveyances to be avoided or resulted in an efficient Chapter 7 liquidation
rather than an inefficient state-law liquidation. See Warren, supra note 24, at 373-77. It
should also be noted that these numbers miss many of the costs of bankruptcy. The point
here is not that the bankruptcy system as a whole is inefficient, but rather that the system
would likely benefit if poorer bankruptcy prospects were screened out.
120 Of course, bankruptcy and state-law piecemeal dismemberment are not the only
two alternatives. Private contractual arrangements can also be used to deal with insolvency.
Until 1992, Canada permitted secured creditors to enforce contractual provisions permit-
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payments in less than three percent of Chapter 7 cases (including
both individual and business cases).121 One study found that more
than sixty percent of the unmortgaged assets in business Chapter 7
cases went to bankruptcy professionals, and another ten percent to
the direct costs of the bankruptcy proceeding, leaving only thirty per-
cent for unsecured creditors. 122 Not surprisingly, it has been sug-
gested that failing firms may dispose of their own assets more
effectively than bankruptcy law.' 23
That bankruptcy is of little value to unsecured creditors has
gained additional support from a different sort of data. A recent
study of stock market data found that when a firm files for bank-
ruptcy, there is a statistically significant negative effect on the value of
the stock of its unsecured creditors (but not its secured creditors),
supporting the hypothesis that bankruptcy dissipates value otherwise
available for unsecured creditors. 24 Moreover, the data show-that
bankruptcy imposes a net loss on the shareholders of public corpora-
tions despite the regular violation of absolute priority, providing an-
other indication that bankruptcy's costs may indeed exceed its
benefits in many cases.125
That the costs exceed the benefits in many or even most bank-
ruptcy cases does not necessarily mean that bankruptcy is inefficient
or should be abolished.126 For example, the availability of bankruptcy
ting them to appoint a receiver to take control of a firm's assets upon default, thus elimi-
nating the concern that management will undertake risky, suboptimal strategies after
default in an attempt to restore solvency and preserve their jobs. Moreover, this remedy
was quick, eliminating many of the direct costs of a bankruptcy proceeding. See Buckley,
supra note 85, at 738-40, 750-52.
121 See Lynn LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887, 1932 n.172
(1994).
122 See Lawless et al., supra note 105. James Ang examined a cross-section of business
liquidation cases under the pre-1978 Bankruptcy Act, finding that administrative expenses
averaged 7.5% of liquidation value of the assets. SeeJames S. Ang et al., The Administrative
Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A Note, 37J. FIN. 219, 223-24 (1982). The discrepancy between
these studies may be due to the fact that Lawless counted only distributions to unsecured
creditors, ignoring mortgaged assets, while Ang counted all of the debtors' assets.
123 SeeJames W. Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theo2y,
and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REv. 27, 51-57 (1991).
124 See Bowers, supra note 80, at 967-68.
125 See id. at 957 n.11. Deviations from absolute priority are larger for small, private
companies than for public companies. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 115, at 149.
However, the costs of bankruptcy may also be larger as a share of the firm's assets. See text
accompanying notes 103-06. On balance, it is difficult to know whether shareholders bene-
fit from bankruptcy in smaller cases.
126 For a heated debate on the efficiency of the bankruptcy system and the conclusions
that can, or cannot, be drawn from the empirical data, see Bowers, supra note 80 (citing
empirical evidence that bankruptcy results in a net dissipation of the debtor's value);
Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.
1043 (1992) (an empirical study concluding that shareholders fare worse under the Bank-
ruptcy Code than under prior law);Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss, The Untena-
ble CaseFor Chapter 11: A Review of the Evidence, 67 AM. B~Ai. LJ. 131 (1993) (criticizing the
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may lead to efficient restructurings in many cases that do not get to
court and so do not appear in the data. 127 However, this observation
does not negate the value of a mechanism that would permit poor
candidates for reorganization to avoid the costs of a failed reorganiza-
tion, or allow the liquidation of firms under state law where Chapter 7
provides no net advantage. If, as the prior section suggests, bank-
ruptcy waivers can serve as this mechanism, then they may fulfill an
important function in rendering the bankruptcy system more
efficient.
III
WAIVERS AND BANKRupTcY SORTING
A. The Bankruptcy Sorting Process
Although bankruptcy waivers provide a mechanism by which
creditors and firms may attempt to sort, in advance, promising bank-
ruptcy candidates from less promising ones,128 or valuable bankruptcy
rights from costly ones, 129 the Bankruptcy Code itself provides mecha-
nisms for accomplishing this.130 For example, when a creditor moves
to dismiss a Chapter 11 case or to convert it to liquidation under
Chapter 7, the court is directed to convert or dismiss the case, "which-
ever is in the best interest of the creditors and the estate, for cause,
including" various factors.13' These factors primarily address the risk
that no plan will be confirmed and consummated, or that creditors
will suffer unduly from the delay, expense, or business losses caused
by the reorganization effort.' 32 Thus, the court is asked to determine
Bradley and Rosenzweig study); Donald R._ Korobkin, The Unwarranted Case Against Corpo-
rate Reorganizations: A Reply to Bradley and Rosenzweig, 78 IOWA L. REv. 669 (1993) (same);
Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors Bradley and Rosen-
zweig, 91 MICH. L REv. 79 (1992) (same); Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of
Chapter 11, 102 YALE LJ. 437 (1992) (same); Bowers, supra note 4 (replying to Warren and
LoPucki).
127 See Warren, supra note 24, at 373-77.
128 See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
129 See supra text accompanying notes 84-91.
130 See MichelleJ. White, Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device: Chapter 11 Reorganiza-
tions and Out-Of-Court Debt Restructurings, 10J.L. ECON. & ORe. 268 (1994) (suggesting that
asymmetric information may result in errors in separating efficient bankruptcy candidates
from inefficient ones). White notes the possibility that out-of-court restructurings may in
fact cause effective filtering techniques in bankruptcy (if such things exist) to become inef-
fective. However, White's model assumes that the goal of the firm's managers is to avoid
liquidation regardless of the interests of its creditors. Under this premise, a firm would not
agree to a bankruptcy waiver unless that waiver either (1) sufficiently delayed the time until
liquidation for the managers to make up the loss they suffer from the greater likelihood of
liquidation, or (2) decreased the likelihood of insolvency through lower capital costs.
Thus, inefficient waivers would be rare under the premises of White's model.
'3' 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1994).
132 See id. The listed factors are:
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the likelihood that the parties are truly benefitting from the bank-
ruptcy process.
The sorting process is also inherent in secured creditors' motions
for relief from the automatic stay. The Bankruptcy Code provides for
relief from stay either "for cause,"133 or based on a specific finding
that the firm has no equity in the collateral and the collateral is not
necessary for an effective reorganization. 34 The first standard clearly
encompasses the potential costs and benefits of the proceeding. The
second standard requires the court to determine whether reorganiza-
tion is a reasonable prospect and, because administrative expenses
must be paid as part of any confirmed plan, it presumably requires the
court to consider whether reorganization is feasible given the likely
direct costs of the bankruptcy proceeding. 3 5 Thus, a lift stay hearing
can be an early opportunity to argue that there is no prospect of
reorganization.13 6
The plan confirmation process is also designed to sort firms ac-
cording to whether or not the bankruptcy proceeding will enhance
creditor recoveries. A reorganization plan cannot be confirmed if any
objecting creditor does not receive at least as much as it would under
(1) continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and absence of a reason-
able likelihood of rehabilitation; (2) inability to effectuate a plan; (3) un-
reasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors; (4) failure to
propose a plan under section 1121 of this title within any time fixed by the
court; (5) denial of confirmation of every proposed plan and denial of a
request made for additional time for filing another plan or a modification
of a plan; (6) revocation of an order of confirmation under section 1144 of
this title, and denial of confirmation of another plan or a modified plan
under section 1129 of this title; (7) inability to effectuate substantial con-
summation of a confirmed plan; (8) material default by the debtor with
respect to a confirmed plan; (9) termination of a plan by reason of the
occurrence of a condition specified in the plan; or (10) nonpayment of any
fees or charges required under chapter 123 of title 28.
These factors are examples, not an exclusive list. See 11 U.S.C. § 102(8) (1994) (the words
"'includes' and 'including' are not limiting").
133 11 U.S.C. § 862(d) (1994).
134 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2) (1994).
135 Administrative expenses, which include the costs of bankruptcy professionals and
the costs of operating the business during the bankruptcy case, are given priority over
unsecured claims. Thus, where administrative expenses are too great to be paid as part of
a successful reorganization, the costs are incurred and yet the firm is still not reorganized.
Moreover, many bankruptcy costs are not considered "administrative expenses" and thus
never show up within the reorganization proceeding at all. These include the cost of man-
agerial time expended by creditors, the fees of bankruptcy professionals employed by cred-
itors (only oversecured creditors may collect such fees as part of their claims), and the
foregone interest on creditors' claims. These costs are typically not considered in bank-
ruptcy court adjudications.
136 This is a deliberately biased hearing, however, because bankruptcy courts grant a
substantial benefit of the doubt to the debtor in any lift stay motion brought early in the
case. See United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S.
865, 376, (1988) (noting that "bankruptcy courts demand less detailed showings during
the four months in which the debtor is given the exclusive right to put together a plan").
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Chapter 7, which in essence requires that a plan not be confirmed
unless it generates more value than liquidation.18 7 The requirement
that the plan yield more than liquidation is further supported by a
requirement that the judge determine whether or not the plan is
"likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further finan-
cial reorganization, of the debtor."'38
The general refusal to enforce bankruptcy waivers thus presuma-
bly reflects a determination either (1) that the bankruptcy process is
better than ex ante negotiations at distinguishing good bankruptcy
candidates from poor ones (i.e., the earlier assessments of private par-
ties are not as accurate as the later assessments of bankruptcy judges),
or (2) that firms and their creditors will not make appropriate judg-
ments of the social costs and benefits associated with a waiver (private
assessments will not incorporate the full range of legitimate bank-
ruptcy concerns). Both of these concerns must be addressed in con-
sidering the role of contractual waivers in the bankruptcy process.
B. Accuracy of Contractual v. Judicial Assessments
The refusal to enforce bankruptcy waivers may reflect a belief
that private parties lack the information or ability to determine, at the
time of the waiver, whether a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding
would be worth the cost.'3 9 However, it seems likely that at least some
firms and their creditors can determine with reasonable accuracy
whether reorganization or liquidation is likely to be preferable should
the firm become insolvent. 40 For many types of firns, the probable
137 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (7) (1994) (providing that any dissenting impaired creditor
must receive at least as much as it would in a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding).
138 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (11) (1994).
139 Whether or not waivers would sort firms might depend on whether permitting
waivers would result in a pooling or separating equilibrium. If neither borrowers nor
lenders can determine in advance whether a firm is likely to be a good or bad bankruptcy
candidate, then the result may be a pooling equilibrium in which either all firms or none
would waive their bankruptcy rights. It could be expected that all firms would waive their
bankruptcy rights if (1) a waiver is on average the profit maximizing choice for borrowers
and lenders, and lenders cannot determine which, if any, firms can profitably retain bank-
ruptcy rights, or (2) waivers are profit maximizing for lenders but not for borrowers, and
lenders can compel borrowers to accede to waivers due to a lack of borrower understand-
ing or bargaining leverage. See infra Part IV.C. The evidence from Canada, where until
1992 firms could contract to permit their creditors to appoint a receiver upon default, is
that the result might be a pooling equilibrium in which most or all firms waive their bank-
ruptcy rights. See Buckley, supra note 85, at 754. Given that even major corporations
agreed to receivership provisions, it is difficult to construe this as evidence that lenders
were taking advantage of unsophisticated borrowers. Hence, it appears likely that waivers
represent an efficient choice for many firms.
140 Very little has been written on the attributes of firms that reorganize successfully as
opposed to those whose reorganization efforts fail-a remarkable gap in the literature.
Professor LoPucki offered some preliminary information in 1983, Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKER
L.J. 99 (1983), and additional indications are provided in White, supra note 107, at 483. At
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differential between these scenarios may be predictable. For example,
single-asset real estate enterprises14' typically are worth almost as
much in liquidation as in reorganization. 142 Firms that depend on the
unique knowledge or talents of owner/managers, customer goodwill,
or other intangibles that are not readily transferable, are likely to have
greater differentials.' 43 Thus, it is not surprising that a study would
find that manufacturing firms have a fifty-seven percent success rate in
Chapter 11 (eighty-six percent for large manufacturers), compared
with twelve percent for other types of debtors. 44 And as experience
under the Bankruptcy Code (adopted in 1978) accumulates, firms
and their creditors should become better at gauging its costs and
benefits. 145
Further, firms and their creditors may be better than bankruptcy
judges at predicting the likely costs and benefits of bankruptcy.146 A
least one empirical study has examined the attributes of public firms that are able to suc-
cessfully reorganize without resort to bankruptcy. The study concluded that various identi-
fiable features (fewer creditors and less complex financial structures, more debt to banks,
and more intangible assets) were statistically significant indicators of the ability to restruc-
ture successfully without a bankruptcy filing. See Stuart C. Gilson et al., Troubled Debt
Restructurings: An Empirical Study of Private Reorganization of Firms in Defaul 27J. FIN. ECON.
315 (1990). Moreover, the Gilson study indicates that stock market participants are able to
anticipate which firms will and will not be able to restructure privately. See id. at 342-45.
However, the model had quite limited explanatory power. Other studies confirm that the
market is able to make meaningful predictions about the likely outcomes of bankruptcy
filings. See Bowers, supra note 80. On the cost side, Altman, supra note 104, at 1077, re-
ports that total direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy were 12.2% of firm value for a
sample of large retailers, but 23.7% for large industrial companies, indicating parties
might anticipate significant differences based on observable firm characteristics.
141 "Single asset real estate" is not intended to have the limited meaning provided in
section 101 (51B) of the Bankruptcy Code which, among other things, limits the definition
to entities with noncontingent, liquidated secured debt of $4 million or less. As a concep-
tual matter, larger entities are equally within the category.
142 See Brian S. Katz, Single-Asset Real Estate Cases and the Good Faith Requirement: Why
Reluctance To Ask Whether A Case Belongs In Bankruptcy May Lead To The Incorrect Result, 9
BAR. DErv.J. 77, 85 (1992).
143 Gilson et al. theorize that Chapter 11 will be more expensive, relative to private
restructurings, for firms whose assets are intangible or firm-specific, because this type of
value is more likely to be lost in Chapter 11. This variable was statistically significant as an
indicator of the likelihood of restructuring outside of bankruptcy, adding credence to hy-
pothesis. See Gilson et al., supra note 140, at 334-36.
144 LoPucki, supra note 140, at 100, 108-14. Given the sample studied (48 cases filed in
one district in one year), these results are not necessarily representative of all Chapter 11
filings.
145 Indeed, as discussed in Part I, supra, it appears that this increased understanding of
the costs and benefits of the Bankruptcy Code has spawned the current interest in bank-
ruptcy waivers. Further, if waivers were routinely enforced, the ability to determine when a
waiver is or is not efficient would become a source of competitive advantage for lenders,
leading them to hone their abilities to determine optimal remedies for different types of
firms.
146 For a contrary view, arguing against the enforcement of waivers of the automatic
stay because of the value of having an "unbiased and unprejudiced overseer of the debtor's
creditors and assets" (the bankruptcy judge), see Bassin, supra note 50, at 10.
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decision on expected costs and benefits made by market participants
would reflect all readily available information. 147 In contrast, there
are various inherent limitations in deciding a motion to lift stay, dis-
missing the proceeding, or confirming a plan. First, the bankruptcy
judge must reach a decision by sorting between competing biased pro-
jections by the parties' respective witnesses. Second, the judge is likely
to discount many indirect costs of bankruptcy. Some, such as lost
market opportunities caused by bankruptcy delay, inefficiencies
caused by the rent-seeking behavior of bankruptcy participants, or
perceptions about the future direction of relevant markets, are diffi-
cult or impossible to show through admissible evidence. These factors
may involve problems of hearsay or speculation and may be inadmissi-
ble under the rules of evidence. Other significant factors are deemed
legally irrelevant even though they are economically significant, such
as the costs incurred by creditors in dealing with the bankruptcy
case.1 48 Finally, the market permits people trained and experienced
in business matters, rather than law, to make these judgments, and
permits a borrower to seek another decisionmaker (that is, apply to
other lenders) if it believes a particular lender is unreasonable or uses
poor judgment.
Moreover, errors in anticipating the prospective value of a future
bankruptcy case may be corrected through postdefault negotiations.
In Los Angeles Lumber, for example, the waiver was contained in a bond
indenture which provided for amendment with the consent of holders
of seventy-five percent of face value of the debtor's outstanding
bonds.' 49 Believing that the bankruptcy would preserve significant go-
ing concern value, holders of over ninety-two percent of the outstand-
ing bonds consented to the reorganization. 150 Thus, the court could
have held the waiver enforceable, or abstained on that question, and
still held the bankruptcy petition effective on the grounds that the
waiver had been terminated by the consent of the bondholders. Los
Angeles Lumber provides a perfect example of how voluntary adjust-
ments can correct an inefficient waiver of bankruptcy rights.
147 See Baird, supra note 4, at 136-37.
148 The confirmation process does not even ask the correct question. In evaluating, at
the time of confirmation, whether reorganization or liquidation will yield more for credi-
tors, the costs of the proceeding itself are sunk costs that must be paid under either alter-
native. Instead of asking, "Are the benefits of reorganization greater than the costs," the
court asks, "Having already borne the costs of reorganization, is reorganization better than
liquidation?" And, the costs borne by creditors are ignored altogether (with the possible
exception of reasonable costs incurred by oversecured creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b)
(1994)). Thus, the confirmation process cannot address whether the case should have
been handled as a reorganization in the first place.
149 24 F. Supp. 501, 504 (S.D. Cal. 1938), affd, 100 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd on
other grounds, 808 U.S. 106 (1939).
150 See id. at 514.
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Commentators and evidence suggest that bankruptcyjudges have
limited ability to forecast accurately the merits of a bankruptcy case,
and that their judgment may be skewed in favor of debtors-that is,
reorganization. 151 For example, the Bankruptcy Code provides that a
plan may not be confirmed unless the judge determines that "confir-
mation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the . . . need for
further financial reorganization." 152 Nonetheless, LoPucki and Whit-
ford report that in thirty-two percent of the Chapter 11 cases involving
large public corporations where the corporation remained intact after
confirmation of a plan, the corporation was forced to file for bank-
ruptcy again.153 In a study of Chapter 11 cases confirmed in one dis-
trict in New York, only fifty-eight percent of debtors performed in
accordance with their reorganization plans.'54
Bankruptcy Court determinations have at least one important ad-
vantage over waivers, however. A waiver represents ajudgment made
in advance about the likely costs and benefits of a future situation. It
may turn out that the firm enters bankruptcy under surprising condi-
tions and that the original expectations do not reflect the situation at
the time of the case. 155 Asjust noted, this problem is mitigated by the
possibility that the creditor can be induced to relinquish the waiver in
exchange for a share of the value generated by the reorganization.
However, it is also possible that bilateral monopoly problems will pre-
vent such an agreement. 156 For this reason, it is not enough to say
151 SeeJACKSON, supra note 24, at 220-21 n.38 (noting the comparative efficiency of
markets versus judges in valuing enterprises); MarkJ. Roe, Bankruptcy andDebt: A New Model
For Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 547-48 (1983). This is not to deride
either the ability or motivation ofjudges. However, there is some doubt whether contested
judicial proceedings are a successful means of conducting financial evaluations. This is
one reason corporate law relies on the business judgment rule. See, e.g., AC Acquisitions
Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986) ("This deference-
the business judgment rule-is, of course, simply a recognition... of the limited institu-
tional competence of courts to assess business decisions."); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393
N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979) (stating that "the business judgment doctrine, at least in part,
is grounded in the prudent recognition that courts are ill equipped" to make business
judgments).
152 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1994).
153 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 90, at 608-09.
154 SeeJensen-Conklin, supra note 118, at 324.
155 See Karen Gross, Taking Community Interests Into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 1031, 1043-45 (1994) (arguing that use of flexible procedures such as bank-
ruptcy, rather than strict enforcement of ex ante contractual agreements, is justified be-
cause ex ante bargains may fail to properly anticipate developments).
156 A bilateral monopoly arises when parties have no choice but to negotiate with each
other, and so neither party faces the constraint of competition in conducting its negotia-
tion. Transaction costs may be high in bilateral monopoly situations, because each party
will expend efforts at garnering a larger share of the potential profits from the transaction.
Where these types of strategic bargaining efforts become excessive, they may keep the par-
ties from coming to terms, even though a negotiated resolution would be profitable for
both. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSiS OF LAw 61, 62 (4th ed. 1992).
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that a bankruptcy waiver is automatically enforceable, regardless of
the facts that develop thereafter. There should be some opportunity
to address the possibility that the agreement no longer represents an
accurate balancing of interests, but that strategic bargaining has pre-
vented a contractual readjustment.1 57
C. Appropriateness of Contractual Assessments
Courts have often stated that bankruptcy waivers violate public
policy and are therefore not enforceable. 158 This argument is difficult
to evaluate given the consistent failure to identify the policy at issue,
but the concern presumably lies with the public's interest in the bank-
ruptcy process.
If the goal of bankruptcy is to maximize value for creditors, the
analysis in Parts II and III indicates, with certain caveats, that waivers
should be given substantial weight by the courts. However, the pur-
poses of bankruptcy may be broader than creditor concerns, embody-
ing the interests of the wider community.15 9 A bankruptcy waiver
could reduce the opportunity to preserve various positive externali-
ties, imposing losses that go beyond the financial stake of creditors
and shareholders to include the welfare of employees, communities,
and customers. When a firm minimizes its capital costs by opting out
of bankruptcy protections, it may do so not because this decision is
societally optimal when these noncreditor interests are counted, but
because the internalized benefits of bankruptcy are less than the inter-
157 Although this concern appears to justify judicial review, the conclusion is not be-
yond challenge. Courts will sometimes err in their decisions regarding the enforcement of
particular waivers, and there is no logical reason why the benefits of correcting inefficient
waivers must exceed the direct costs ofjudicial review plus the costs of erroneous determi-
nations. Nonetheless, courts do have the benefit of information not available to the parties
at the time of the contract, a factor which will loom large in a presumably small number of
cases presenting extraordinary and unanticipated developments.
158 See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
159 See generally Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits of the
Judicial Process, 74 N.C. L. REv. 75 (1995) (discussing wealth redistribution); Gross, supra
note 155 (addressing the importance of community interests); Hon. Barry S. Schermer,
Response to Professor Gross: Taking The Interests Of The Community Into Account in Bankruptcy-A
Modern-Day Tale of Belling the Cat, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1049 (1994) (asserting that the commu-
nity interest argument errs in three respects: definition, application, and the role of the
decisionmaker); Donald R. Korobkin, Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of
Bankruptcy Law, 71 TEx. L. REv. 541, 552-58 (1993) (arguing that the first principles of
bankruptcy law are inclusion of all affected by financial distress and rationally determining
how they fare); Warren, supra note 24 (noting that the bankruptcy system preserves value,
distributes value, and allocates costs of failing businesses). Accommodating interests be-
yond those of the firm and its creditors does not inherently invalidate an economic, wealth-
maximizing approach to bankruptcy law. See Frost, supra (arguing that bankruptcy courts
are ill-suited to pursue redistributive goals); Rasmussen, supra note 98 (arguing that a Rawl-




nalized costs. 160 If bankruptcy encompasses interests beyond those of
the creditors and the firm, a contractual waiver cannot be presumed
to reflect the properjudgment of its total costs and benefits.
The debate over the proper goals of an ideal bankruptcy law
need not be settled in considering the treatment of waivers under the
Bankruptcy Code, which pays considerable attention to maximizing
creditor recoveries without adopting the single-minded pursuit of that
goal. The Code permits the bankruptcy judge to convert or dismiss
the case, or lift the stay, "for cause." As noted above, the standards
specified in the Code go primarily to the ability to confirm and imple-
ment a plan of reorganization and the risk of undue prejudice to cred-
itors. 161 Thus, the court must focus on the likelihood and potential
cost of reorganization in determining whether "cause" exists to con-
vert, dismiss, or lift the stay.
However, the creditors' bargain has not been enacted into law.
The "cause" standard is deliberately vague, permitting the court to
consider whatever factors it deems appropriate within a broad range
of discretion. 162 Although far from clear, the legislative history indi-
cates that members of Congress were concerned with the fate of em-
ployees and communities as well as the preservation of economic
value for creditors and investors. 63 Thus, the Code arguably permits
consideration of broad social concerns in ruling on the enforceability
of particular waivers.'6 However, these concerns do not mandate
that waivers be rejected out of hand nor even that they be presumed
invalid. Rather, these concerns may be considered alongside the goal
of wealth maximization. Differentjudges will perceive the balance dif-
160 Korobkin, supra note 159, at 552-58; LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 90, at 603;
Warren, supra note 24, at 356; Warren, supra note 126. Moreover, to the extent that bank-
ruptcy has as a deliberate policy the internalization of costs of business failure that would
otherwise be externalized, the blanket enforcement of waivers would frustrate this policy.
See Warren, supra note 24, at 361-68.
161 See supra text accompanying note 132.
162 See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 405-06 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.CAN. 5963, 6361-62:
Subsection (b) gives wide discretion to the court to make an appropriate
disposition of the case when a party in interest requests. The court is per-
mitted to convert a reorganization case to a liquidation case or to dismiss
the case, whichever is in the best interest of creditors and the estate, only
for cause.... The list is not exhaustive. The court will be able to consider
other factors as they arise, and to use its equitable powers to reach an ap-
propriate result in individual cases.
163 "The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to
restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees
with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders." H.R. RE'. No. 595,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5963, 6179.
164 A contrary intention could be found by emphasizing the legislative and statutory
emphasis on "the best interest of the creditors and the estate," noting that the language




ferently, but the Code has neither adopted a model of pure creditor,
interests nor given judges a charter to make open-ended decisions to
benefit the broader community regardless of the creditors. 165
When the "for cause" standard is applied, then, the court must
accord significant but not always determinative weight to creditor re-
coveries. Considering the economic analysis of waivers in light of this
standard, the relevance of a waiver of bankruptcy rights becomes ap-
parent. A knowingly contracted waiver is evidence that the firm and
its creditor(s) believed the cost of the waived right would exceed its
benefit. A waiver of reorganization rights, for example, indicates that
the firm and its creditor(s) believed that an effective reorganization
was unlikely, or at least unlikely to be worth the expense. As it evi-
dences the belief of some of the parties in the best position to evaluate
the issue, the waiver provides an indication that "cause" does exist to
convert or dismiss the case.
Similarly, a waiver of the automatic stay granted to a secured
creditor is an indication that the parties expected the costs of involv-
ing the secured party in a bankruptcy proceeding would outweigh the
value that the collateral would contribute to the reorganization pro-
cess. If the court determined the stay was causing greater harm to the
creditor than benefit to the estate, that would be a factor in favor of
lifting the stay. The parties' agreed prediction of this relative balance
should be considered evidence that this is, in fact, the case and should
be weighed by the court in addressing a lift stay motion. Moreover,
these advance waivers should be accorded greater weight than mere
testimony, because the parties' negotiated agreement to include the
waiver provides credibility that cannot be matched by self-interested
testimony at the time of the bankruptcy case.
In short, wealth maximization is one important goal in bank-
ruptcy. If it is considered the overriding goal, the argument for en-
forcing bankruptcy waivers is quite strong. However, acknowledging
that other goals may play a role in bankruptcy does not lead to the
conclusion that waivers are per se invalid. Rather, enforcement is ap-




Although the economic model outlined in Part II.A provides a
framework for thinking about bankruptcy waivers, it also simplifies the
165 Under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the court had authority in some bank-
ruptcy cases to confirm or reject a plan of reorganization based on a determination that it
was or was not "consistent with public policy." Warren, supra note 24, at 356 n.47. The
current Bankruptcy Code has no such provision.
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world to such an extent that its usefulness for prescribing policy is
minimal. Problems related to the availability of information, the abil-
ity to process that information, and other externalities cannot fairly
be assumed away, and it is these problems which define the appropri-
ate rules regarding the enforcement of bankruptcy waivers. Part IV.A
asks whether bankruptcy waivers will prejudice unsophisticated un-
secured creditors or tort creditors, concluding that the risk to these
parties is minimal. Parts IV.B and IV.C consider whether the eco-
nomic model must be modified in light of asymmetric information
between debtors and creditors and agency problems inherent in man-
agement decisionmaking, concluding that these concerns do not war-
rant the rejection of contractual waivers. Part IV.D considers the role
of waivers in one particularly important setting-prebankruptcy
workout negotiations-and finds that waivers may play an important
role in encouraging consensual resolutions that would otherwise fail
due to information asymmetries.
A. Prejudice To Unsecured Creditors
Courts that refuse to enforce waivers of bankruptcy rights often
reason that those rights protect not only the firm but the firn's credi-
tors as a group.' 66 If bankruptcy rights protect the firm's creditors,
the reasoning goes, then the firm cannot waive them because it would
be waiving the rights of others.
In a world with perfect information, waivers would not harm most
unsecured creditors, because they could modify their contracts with
the firm in light of a waiver. In the real world, however, bankruptcy
may protect unsophisticated unsecured creditors who do not know
enough to modify their contracts and involuntary creditors who are
unable to modify their "arrangements" with the firm to compensate
for any increased risk. If this is so, then a waiver could prejudice the
interests of these parties.' 67
166 See, e.g., Commerzanstaltv. Telewide Systems, Inc., 790 F.2d 206, 207 (2d Gir.), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 794 F.2d 763 (2d ir. 1986), modified on remand, 684 F. Supp. 1172
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), affid as modified, 880 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Since the purpose of the
stay is to protect creditors as well as the debtor, the debtor may not waive the automatic
stay."); In re Sky Group Int% Inc., 108 B.R. 86, 88 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) ("The legislative
history makes it clear that the automatic stay has a dual purpose of protecting the debtor
and all creditors alike.").
167 Professor LoPucki suggests that a principal explanation for secured credit is the
ability of the firm and its secured creditors to advantage themselves at the expense of
involuntary creditors and unsophisticated unsecured creditors. See LoPucki, supra note
121. For replies to this thesis, see Susan Block-Lieb, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain: A
Reply, 80 VA. L. Ray. 1989 (1994); Steven L Harris & Charles W. MooneyJr., A Property-
Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2021 (1994);
Steve Knippenberg, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain: An Essay in Reply, Reprisa, or Support?,
80 VA. L. Rxv. 1967 (1994).
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Moreover, there is a risk that waivers will be used to reallocate.
rather than create value, which may suggest that such waivers are un-
fair even to sophisticated contractual unsecured creditors. Unsecured
creditors who price their debt on the expectation that insolvency will
result in a given distribution from the bankruptcy case may lose that
expected bankruptcy distribution if the firm subsequently waives its
bankruptcy rights. This would transfer value to the secured credi-
tor 168 from the unsecured creditors existing at the time of the waiver.
In exchange, the firm might obtain credit from the secured creditor
on more favorable terms, the benefit of which inures in part to un-
secured creditors (through a reduced risk of insolvency), but primar-
ily to equity holders. 169
Having acknowledged these theoretical possibilities of prejudice
to unsecured creditors, the importance of these concerns in the real
world is limited for at least two reasons. First, bankruptcy appears to
offer little value to unsecured creditors. In fact, the evidence indi-
cates that bankruptcy harms unsecured creditors in most cases, and
thus waiving bankruptcy often will benefit unsecured creditors.'70
This should come as no surprise in light of the evidence on the costs
of bankruptcy presented in Part II.B. Second, and a related point,
unsecured creditors are subject to numerous risks to their ability to
collect on their claims, and bankruptcy waivers probably add little to
the total risk.
Consider the precarious position of the unsecured creditor apart
from the risk of a bankruptcy waiver. Many firms do the bulk of their
borrowing through secured debt, and modern secured financing tech-
niques allow a lender to perfect a security interest in essentially all of a
firm's assets. 17 1 Even if the firm has substantial unpledged assets at
the time it contracts with a particular unsecured creditor, the firm
could give a blanket lien to a new secured creditor or to an old credi-
tor in exchange for an extension of time or additional credit.172 And
168 Obviously, waivers could be obtained by parties other than secured creditors, but it
seems most likely that waivers would be sought by secured creditors hoping to avoid the
delay caused by the automatic stay. For this reason, I will generally assume that a primary
secured creditor seeks the waiver.
169 The reduction in interest charges by the secured creditor will benefit future un-
secured creditors, whether knowledgeable commercial parties, unsophisticated trade credi-
tors, or tort victims, by reducing the risk of insolvency. Cf. Harris & Mooney, supra note
167, at 2028-37 (arguing that secured credit may benefit rather than harm unsecured cred-
itors by improving the firm's business opportunities).
170 See supra text accompanying note 124.
171 Harris & Mooney, supra note 167, at 2070.
172 For example, in the W.T. Grant bankruptcy, the firm owed approximately $500
million to its major creditors. See In re W.T. Grant Co., 699 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert denied,
464 U.S. 822 (1988). Once in financial distress, the firm arranged to borrow an additional
$100 million from these creditors, granting security interests in previously unencumbered
assets to secure all $600 million. The funds permitted W.T. Grant to avoid bankruptcy for
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there are numerous other ways in which unsecured creditors' claims
against the firm's assets may be supplanted. Decisions regarding addi-
tional unsecured debt or the use or sale of assets may prejudice un-
secured creditors. 17 Or the firm could pay dividends to its
shareholders. As long as the transaction is not a fraudulent convey-
ance and falls outside the preference period, unsecured creditors
have no remedy for the increased risks imposed by these types of
transactions.
Thus, it is not surprising that "[t]he large bulk of unsecured
credit is not extended on the basis of priority in liquidation values of
assets."174 Rather, unsecured creditors depend on the income stream
generated by the firm and the availability of extra-legal remedies, such
as the ability to mar the firm's reputation and thus impair its ability to
deal with others, that may pressure the firm to pay its unsecured
debt.175 Unsecured creditors generally know that if the firm goes into
bankruptcy, they are likely to recover little or nothing.176 In fact,
given the cost of bankruptcy, it is quite conceivable that such credi-
tors, on average, would receive more outside of bankruptcy, albeit on
a first-in-time basis.
This does not mean that unsecured creditors are never paid in
bankruptcy. Some firms borrow substantial amounts on an unsecured
more than a year, and thus the granting of security for the entire debt, including the pre-
existing $500 million, could not be set aside as a preference. See id. See also Lynn M.
LoPucki, A General Thewy of the Dynamis of the State Remedies/Bankrupty System, 1982 Wis. L
REv. 311, 337-338 (1982). Such a transaction is also subject to challenge as a fraudulent
transfer, but it may be difficult or impossible to show that the transaction was made with
the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, as required under 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a) (1) (1994), or that it was not for reasonably equivalent value, as required under 11
U.S.C. § 548(a) (2) (1994).
178 See Harris & Mooney, supra note 167, at 2037-41.
174 LoPucki, supra note 121, at 1936.
175 See id at 1941.
176 See Bowers, supra note 87, at 2098 (supporting the proposition that "[g] eneral cred-
itors don't get paid by bankrupts"); LoPucki, supra note 121, at 1932 n.172 (citing study
finding that general unsecured creditors received payments in only 2.8% of Chapter 7
cases); White, supra note 107, at 483 (noting that unsecured creditors received 3% of their
claims in liquidation cases, and less than 32% of their claims in reorganization cases).
LoPucki notes that payments to unsecured creditors are commonly promised in confirmed
Chapter 11 plans. See LoPucki, supra note 167, at 1932 n.172. However, relatively few
Chapter 11 filings result in confirmed plans and, even in those that do, the prospects of
unsecured creditors appear fairly bleak. See id. Susan Jensen-Conklin reports that in a
study of 260 Chapter 11 filings, 45 resulted in confirmed plans. SeeJensen-Conklin, supra
note 118, at 318. Of the 42 confirmed plans for which information could be determined,
seven proposed paying unsecured creditors less than 10%; 15 plans proposed payments of
10% to 15%; 11 plans proposed payments between 16 and 30%; one plan proposed 53%;
one plan proposed 75%; and the remaining seven plans promised full payment. See id. at
322-23. These figures suggest an average promised payment of roughly 31% of the un-
secured debt, and even this apparently overstates creditor recoveries because, while many
of these plans failed to consummate, the plans offering the lowest payments were the most
likely to be "successful." See id. at 326.
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basis while maintaining unpledged assets. This is particularly com-
mon among large public firms, whose lenders insist on covenants that
the firm will leave substantial assets unencumbered.'77 Such firms are
probably least likely to waive their bankruptcy rights, 78 but if such a
firm were to waive its bankruptcy rights to advantage a particularly
aggressive unsecured lender, its other unsecured creditors could be
disadvantaged. However, contractual unsecured creditors routinely
obtain protections against various risks, and these protections are
equally applicable to waivers. Just as unsecured lenders often require
negative pledge clauses, 7 9 they can require disclosures about any ex-
isting waivers' 80 and agreements not to waive bankruptcy rights.18' If
they do not seek contractual protections, then they are far more at
risk from the mortgaging of the firm's assets than from a bankruptcy
waiver.182
Ultimately, the risks posed by a bankruptcy waiver could be fur-
ther mitigated by requiring their recordation.' 8 3 It would be relatively
easy to provide for any waiver of bankruptcy rights to be recorded in
the Uniform Commercial Code records or in an equivalent filing sys-
tem, thus informing subsequent creditors who are concerned enough
to verify the firm's financial condition through a search.
Tort creditors could in some cases be prejudiced by a bankruptcy
waiver and, as nonconsensual creditors, they cannot obtain contrac-
tual protections against this risk. Likewise, a filing system would not
improve their situation. However, the real problem facing tort credi-
tors lies not in the risk of losing bankruptcy protection, because bank-
ruptcy gives tort creditors little if anything more than their state law
entitlements. 8 4 The real problem faced by tort creditors is the prior-
177 See LoPucki, supra note 121, at 1924-31; Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18
J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 216-18 (1989).
178 See infra Part IV.B.
179 See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing 86 COLUM. L. REv. 901,
922 (1986).
180 Creditors routinely ask about the existence of substantial debt obligations before
extending credit. See Schwartz, supra note 177, at 218-21. It would impose only a minimal
additional burden to inquire whether prior creditors required bankruptcy waivers.
181 If a creditor knowingly violates such a contract, the creditor could be equitably
subordinated or face liability for tortious interference with contract rights.
182 Mortgaging the assets would move the secured creditor ahead of these unsecured
creditors. A bankruptcy waiver would leave these unsecured creditors with equal access to
the firm's assets through state-court enforcement proceedings.
183 Many bankruptcy waivers are recorded as part of a mortgage or mortgage-modifica-
tion agreement. Others are contained in documents related to a filed UCC financing
statement. Thus, in many cases, there is limited public notice of the waiver. However,
there is no system established specifically to provide notice of bankruptcy waivers.
184 Probably the major advantage that bankruptcy provides to tort creditors is the abil-
ity to solve the temporal problem in mass tort situations. Tort victims are protected by
bankruptcy filing from the risk that other tort victims will complete their lawsuits and col-
lect their claims, leaving the firm without assets to pay later claimants. A mass tort situation
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ity accorded to secured claims, which may leave tort claimants without
recourse to most or all of a firm's assets.185 Bankruptcy does not
change this basic fact of state law priority, and bankruptcy waivers are
therefore unlikely to prejudice tort creditors in many cases. In fact, if
waivers are efficient, they may benefit tort creditors rather than preju-
dice them.
The flip side of the fact that bankruptcy appears to provide little
value to unsecured creditors is that the most likely beneficiaries of
bankruptcy, if anyone does in fact benefit, are equity holders, given
their ability to use bankruptcy to extract value from creditors despite
the firm's insolvency.' 86 If bankruptcy rights inure primarily to the
benefit of shareholders, and if shareholders are adequately repre-
sented by management in the negotiations over the bankruptcy
waiver, then the costs of the waiver will be accounted for by the firm
and weighed against the benefits being offered by the creditor seeking
the waiver.
In sum, unsecured creditors face substantial risks, and consensual
unsecured creditors may take those risks into account in their transac-
tions with the firm. But, while it is often said that bankruptcy reorgan-
ization is designed to benefit unsecured creditors, it appears to do
them little good.'8 7 In light of the relative inefficacy of bankruptcy in
obtaining distributions for unsecured creditors-caused largely by the
availability of secured credit-the additional risks imposed by bank-
ruptcy waivers are likely to be modest. Moreover, these risks will be
offset by efficiency gains where bankruptcy would have resulted in a
net dissipation of the firm's value. In light of the potential benefits of
waivers, these limited increases in the risks to unsecured creditors
present less than convincing support for the law's hostility to waivers.
would generally be grounds to disregard a bankruptcy waiver under the test proposed in
this Article. If the waiver is given in deliberate anticipation of a mass tort scenario, then it
represents an attempt to reallocate rather than create value. If the mass tort situation was
unexpected, it may represent a change of circumstances sufficiently drastic to disregard
the waiver. However, even in the mass tort scenario, waivers may deserve enforcement if
the firm has sufficient insurance to cover its liabilities.
185 See, e.g., Michael P. Coffey, In Defense of Limited Liability-A Reply to Hansmann and
Kraakman, 1 GEo. MAsoN L. REv. 59 (1994); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, To-
ward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE LJ. 1879 (1991); David W.
Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1565, 1646-50
(1991).
186 See supra text accompanying notes 114, 117-19.
187 See LoPucki, supra note 121, at 194647 (arguing that bankruptcy serves the interest
of secured creditors by failing to recognize the extra-legal mechanisms relied upon by un-
secured creditors to obtain payment of their claims).
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B. Asymmetric Information and Management Incentives
The analysis presented above assumes that both firms and their
creditors have accurate information regarding the expected costs and
benefits of bankruptcy. However, management may have better infor-
mation than creditors regarding firm prospects. l88 Moreover, man-
agement's incentives are not precisely aligned either with creditors' or
shareholders' interests. In the usual case, managers are relatively un-
diversified, having invested in the firm much of their human capital
and often a large proportion of their financial portfolio. 8 9 Managers
are thus concerned with increasing share value, but they are also more
sensitive than other shareholders to the risk of insolvency, which
could cost management their jobs. 190
How does the combination of asymmetric information and man-
agement interests affect the analysis of waivers? Assume managers
know whether a firm is a good bankruptcy prospect or a poor one, but
creditors do not. Additionally, assume managers seekjob security and
increased share value. The result will be that poor bankruptcy candi-
dates will sometimes waive their bankruptcy rights and good bank-
ruptcy candidates will never do so.
If managers know that a firm is a poor bankruptcy candidate,
then wealth maximization, for the firm and its creditors, would re-
quire that the firm waive its bankruptcy rights in exchange for advan-
tageous credit terms. However, because creditors cannot tell whether
the firm is a good bankruptcy candidate, management will be able to
choose whether to disclose this fact. Management will admit that the
firm is a poor bankruptcy candidate, and so waive bankruptcy rights,
only if that disclosure advances their interests.
The reduced credit costs gained by a waiver will benefit managers
through a lower likelihood of insolvency, longer time until insolvency,
and greater job security and compensation due to improved profits.
Managers will also consider the improved share value that they realize
on their portfolio of company stock and options. Against these gains,
managers will balance the reduced opportunity to retain their posi-
tions in case of insolvency. Chapter 11 may permit managers to retain
their positions during a bankruptcy case, and offers the possibility of a
188 At least one study has presented evidence that distressed firms use their superior
information and control over accounting conventions to influence the perceptions of cred-
itors, thus improving their terms in debt renegotiations. See Harry DeAngelo et al., An
Empirical Investigation of The Relation Between Accounting Choice and Dividend Policy
in Troubled Companies (1990) (unpublished paper, University of Michigan), cited in Gil-
son et al., supra note 140, at 323-24.
189 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholder vesus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1, 18-20 (1986); Frank M. Easterbrook & David R. Fischel, Limited
Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 89, 107-08 (1985).
190 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 189, at 108.
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miraculous recovery by the firm during the bankruptcy, whether
through management efforts or serendipitous market changes. More-
over, even if managers often lose their positions as a result of bank-
ruptcy, the threat of bankruptcy might permit managers to negotiate
workouts with creditors that would not otherwise be possible, 191 and
thus enhance their job security. Thus, managers are likely to resist
waivers even where they provide a net benefit to the firm as a
whole. 192 As a result, some poor candidates will (efficiently) waive
their bankruptcy rights, and others will (inefficiently) choose not to
do so.
Now consider the scenario where managers know that the firm is
a good bankruptcy candidate. A bankruptcy waiver would be ineffi-
cient and would lower stock value. It would also reduce job security by
costing management their jobs upon insolvency, rather than permit-
ting them to retain their jobs during, and perhaps after, reorganiza-
tion. Thus, asymmetric information and management incentives
should not lead to good bankruptcy candidates waiving their rights.
According to this analysis, waivers should be expected from some,
but not all, firms for which the expected costs of bankruptcy exceed
the benefits. Firms for which bankruptcy represents a probable net
gain are expected not to waive their rights. Thus, enforcing waivers
will seldom result in'foreclosing bankruptcy as an option for good
bankruptcy candidates. 19
C. The Problem of Unsophisticated Borrowers
If there is a significant objection to the enforcement of bank-
ruptcy waivers, it is probably that unsophisticated borrowers may not
understand the import of a waiver and so may not extract value for the
waiver from the creditor obtaining the waiver. If this is so, then the
presumption that a waiver represents a value-maximizing decision is
not warranted.
Although borrowers have a natural advantage in understanding
the specifics of their businesses, lenders may have a more relevant in-
formational advantage in negotiating bankruptcy provisions. Lenders
are present in the credit markets on a daily basis and specialize in
understanding credit arrangements, security devices, and protections..
Borrowers may have their primary expertise in other areas, and small
191 See infra Part IV.D.
192 LoPucki suggests that this same reasoning may lead firms to borrow at higher cost
on an unsecured basis even though less expensive secured financing is available. See
LoPucki, supra note 121, at 1930-31.
19S If a good bankruptcy candidate does enter into a waiver, there is still the possibility
of correcting this fact through a renegotiation in which some of the net benefits of bank-
ruptcy are shared with the creditor holding the waiver. See supra text accompanying notes
149-50.
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borrowers in particular may be relatively unsophisticated regarding
the legal issues and rights included in a loan agreement. Thus, lend-
ers might succeed in obtaining waivers as "boilerplate" provisions even
ff those waivers are inefficient (that is, the loss they impose on the
firm and its other creditors exceeds the benefits to this lender), be-
cause borrowers do not understand their significance. 194
These concerns may be mitigated by the fact that borrowers hire
lawyers and accountants when negotiating their financing, and thus
they may purchase some of this missing knowledge. If such profes-
sionals are used or if a waiver is knowingly and specifically negotiated
between the parties, it makes sense to presume that the borrower
made a deliberate and informed judgment which should be enforced.
However, if waivers become "boilerplate" terms in small business
loans, there may be merit to the concern that borrowers are agreeing
to inefficient terms that they do not understand. 95
Waivers could become boilerplate for either of two reasons. First,
it might be that waivers are generally an efficient loan term (that is, on
average, the costs of bankruptcy exceed the benefits), and parties
therefore agree to include a waiver in the absence of evidence that the
specific borrower is a good bankruptcy candidate. In this case, boiler-
194 The assumption of rational, profit-maximizing behavior is of limited accuracy in
any context, given the cognitive limitations of human beings, agency problems, and other
market imperfections. However, the assumption will approximate reality far more closely
in some circumstances than in others.
The behavioral assumptions that economists use do not imply that every-
body's behavior is consistent with rational choice. But they do rest funda-
mentally on the assumption that competitive forces will see that those who
behave in a rational manner... will survive, and those who do not will fail;
and that therefore in an evolutionary, competitive situation ... the behav-
ior that will be continuously observed will be that of people who have acted
according to such standards.... In those instances where something ap-
proximating the conditions described above exist, the neoclassical model
has been a very effective model for analyzing economic phenomena. For
example, in the study of finance, where financial markets tend to have
many of the characteristics described above, substantial successes have been
made using the straightforward assumptions just described.
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTTrrTIONS, INSTnUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
19-20 (1990). It is sensible to suppose that large, repeat players in the financial markets,
whether lenders or borrowers, who employ individuals with experience and training in law
and finance, will conform fuirly closely to these assumptions. However, firms that are infre-
quent and inexperienced borrowers may be less likely to do so. More important in the
present context, firms that go bankrupt may reflect a lower level of rational decisionmak-
ing than firms that succeed. It appears likely, then, that many small firms that fail will have
made their financing decisions on less than objectively optimal grounds.
195 Moreover, waivers should be discounted unless they are part of a significant busi-
ness or financing arrangement of the firm-a boilerplate waiver included on the back of
an invoice from one of General Motor's stationery suppliers should not render GM ineligi-
ble for bankruptcy reorganization. These types of arrangements are the sort about which




plate waivers serve a valuable function, causing parties to select the
most efficient rule most of the time.
However, there is a second possibility. Even if waivers represent a
net loss, lenders might determine that they can use their informa-
tional advantage to obtain waivers at the expense of unsophisticated
borrowers, resulting in inefficient loan terms. This concern is not
unique to bankruptcy waivers and has resulted in laws in various other
commercial lending contexts intended to establish certain minimum
rights for borrowers. Perhaps the most salient examples are rules gov-
erning the foreclosure of liens. A foundational tenet of mortgage law
is that a borrower may not waive the equity of redemption. 196 This
rule is intended to protect borrowers from overreaching lenders, and
it applies both to personal and commercial transactions. 197 Similarly,
Article 9 of the UCC permits a lender and borrower to determine
most of their respective rights by contract, but does not allow the bor-
rower to waive various postdefault remedies in the initial loan
documents. 198
These prohibitions protect borrowers from irrational decisions,
whether based on ignorance, undue optimism, or bad counsel. 199
They bar the waiver of certain rights that provide protection to the
borrower at little or no cost to the lender because a rational borrower
would almost certainly not agree to waive those rights. In short, they
replace the assumption that borrowers can and will engage in rational
profit maximizing behavior with certain minimal protections that rec-
ognize the irrationality that sometimes prevails. These provisions can
be thought of as per se rules of unconscionability, premised on a be-
lief that no informed and rational borrower would agree to waive
these rights.
However, these rules are very limited in their scope and run
against a powerful presumption that the enforcement of knowing and
informed contracts is in the interest of the parties and society.200 If
196 GRANT S. NELsON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 3.1 (3d ed.
1994).
197 See Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L.
REV. 489, 583-34 (1991) (suggesting that mortgagor protection laws serve as compulsory
insurance and may correct for cognitive limitations and risk aversion of consumers, justifi-
cations less applicable to large businesses and suggesting that "these laws ought to be
amended to cover only those who need the protections-homebuyers and, perhaps, small
businesses").
198 See U.C.C. § 9-501(3) (1994).
199 See Schill, supra note 197, at 524-30 (cataloging reasons individuals are likely to
underestimate the risk of default).
200 The presumption that business entities are best protected through flexible contrac-
tual arrangements rather than mandatory provisions underlies the move in the most recent
drafts of Article 9 to limit certain mandatory protections to "consumer" obligors, rather
than imposing these provisions in business transactions. See U.C.C. Revised Art. 9 (Discus-
sion Draft prepared for the meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on
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these protections are premised on the belief that no informed and
rational borrower would waive them, then commercial bankruptcy
waivers appear to fall outside the rationale. Given the costs of bank-
ruptcy, it appears likely that waivers in many cases are rational, and
given evidence that the parties have weighed the options, such waivers
should not be voided on grounds of presumed irrationality. The con-
cern that lenders will take advantage of borrowers' ignorance, undue
optimism, or desperation may warrant the rejection of boilerplate
bankruptcy waivers. Thus, it is fitting for a court to examine a bank-
ruptcy waiver given by a small business in its initial loan documents for
indications that there was, in fact, a quid pro quo. But where a waiver
has been specifically negotiated by the parties with the advice of coun-
sel, there is no reason to reject the basic presumption that contractual
arrangements should be enforceable.20'
D. Waivers and Workouts
Many mandatory borrower protections may be waived by the bor-
rower subsequent to the initial transaction or after default. For exam-
ple, under UCC sections 9-504 to 9-506, a debtor may not waive rights
of notice, sale of the collateral, and redemption as part of the initial
credit transaction but may waive them after default.20 2 Similarly, the
prohibition against waiving the equity of redemption does not apply
to transfers occurring after the initial mortgage transaction, although
such transfers will be scrutinized by the courts.20 3 Thus, a lender may
purchase the equity of redemption from the borrower after the initial
transaction, provided that the purchase is fair, honest, and for ade-
quate consideration.20 4
By permitting postdefault waivers, the law facilitates out-of-court
accommodations by borrowers and lenders.205 In so doing, it bal-
Uniform State Laws, July 28 - August 4, 1995); Explanatory Note 7 to Section 9-105 (dis-
cussing consumer-related definitions); Introductory Notes to Part 5 (discussing the new
consumer protection provisions). This presumption is also reflected in the common prac-
tice of excepting corporate borrowers from usury protections.
201 As noted in detail in the following section, these concerns change in the workout
context, and a bankruptcy waiver given by a small business as part of a workout agreement
ought to be accorded equal weight as one given by a major corporation. In a workout
context, a small business is likely to have focused on the relative costs and benefits of the
bankruptcy waiver, and "protecting" small businesses by scrutinizing such waivers would
inhibit workouts. See infra Part IV.D.
202 See U.C.C. §§ 9-504 to -506 (1994).
203 See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 196, § 3.3.
204 See id
205 See Guam Hakubotan, Inc. v. Furusawa Inv. Corp., 947 F.2d 398, 404 (9th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 930 (1992); RinglingJoint Venture II v. Huntington Nat'l Bank,
595 So.2d 180, 182-83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Wright v. First Nat'l Bank of Monroe, 297
N.W. 505, 510-11 (Mich. 1941). But see Russo v. Wolbers, 323 N.W.2d 385, 390-91 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1982); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 196, § 3.3 (arguing that, although a "close
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ances the expectation that the borrower has learned to value its de-
fault rights against the concern that desperate parties will agree to
unreasonable terms. While a borrower's optimism may prevent it
from fully valuing its default protections at the time of the initial loan,
after default the borrower is far more likely to understand the value of
those protections. Thus, postdefault negotiations are, again, entitled
to some presumption of rational maximizing.
Bankruptcy waivers are most often negotiated as part of a
workout or restructuring rather than as part of an initial loan agree-
ment. This appears to be based in part on practitioners' belief that
initial waivers are not enforceable, but that waivers may be enforcea-
ble as part of an out-of-court workout.2 0 6 But there is also an impor-
tant economic explanation for the use of waivers in workouts. Waivers
serve a signalling function that may allow parties to overcome transac-
tion costs caused by asymmetric information. 207 Thus, a bankruptcy
waiver may be efficient as part of a workout even though it would not
have been an efficient part of the initial lending transaction. 208
Assume managers know whether the firm's workout plans are re-
alistic but creditors do not. Managers may claim to have a viable
workout plan because they preserve their jobs during the workout at-
tempt and the subsequent bankruptcy proceeding, and because the
workout lengthens the time during which managers and equity hold-
ers can hope for an extraordinary improvement in the firm's fortunes.
Thus, creditors cannot believe management's assertions that a
workout is cost-effective. As a result, creditors may reject effective
workout proposals because they cannot be distinguished from ineffec-
tive ones.
Management needs a signal that will assure creditors that man-
agement really believes in its workout scenario. A bankruptcy waiver
provides such a signal. By sacrificing the ability, should the workout
fail, to use bankruptcy to retain their positions and preserve equity's
position, management and equity holders accept a significant cost if
the workout fails. By agreeing to accept this cost, management dem-
onstrates its belief that the workout is feasible. Thus, waivers provide
call," postdefault executory waivers of the equity of redemption upon any future default
should not be enforced because of the need to protect borrowers from acting on the "mi-
rage of hope").
206 See Mayer, supra note 9, at 53-56.
207 See Stephen A. Ross, The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling
Approach, 8 BELLJ. OF EcoN. 23 (1977) (demonstrating that an incentive structure that will
penalize managers upon filing of bankruptcy can communicate nonobservable informa-
tion to investors). For a discussion of secured debt as a signalling device, see Roe, supra
note 85, at 221-22; Scott, supra note 179, at 928-29.
208 For an argument that including a bankruptcy waiver in the initial loan documenta-
tion will increase the likelihood of achieving consensual workouts after default, see
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 613-20.
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creditors with important information that would not otherwise be eas-
ily available regarding the sincerity of management's belief. This may
enable parties to agree to workouts that would otherwise be barred by
asymmetric information. This reasoning is consistent with judicial de-
cisions holding that the public policy favoring the consensual settle-
ments supports the enforcement of waivers given during prepetition
workouts. 209
There is a countervailing concern, however, arising from the in-
creasing divergence between the interests of equity holders and credi-
tors as the firm approaches insolvency.210 Equity holders know that
they need a substantial increase in firm value to recover anything, but
they also know that any additional losses will be borne by the credi-
tors. So, when failure looms, the firm's managers and equity holders
may be willing to trade the value available to creditors through a
prompt liquidation for additional time in which to hope for a recov-
ery. To accomplish this, the firm might agree to a workout with its
primary secured lender in which the firm obtains additional credit or
an extension of time to repay existing debt and, in exchange, waives
its bankruptcy rights (in whole or in part), allowing the lender to save
bankruptcy costs if the firm later fails.211 The firm can then engage in
a high-risk strategy for recovery, and the lender will not object be-
cause it knows that its interests are protected by its collateral and the
waiver. Thus, by waiving its bankruptcy rights, the firm may be sacri-
ficing the interests of unsecured creditors with a transaction that
reduces the overall value of the firm but increases the expected value
of the interests of the secured creditor and the shareholders.
The Bankruptcy Code offers a mechanism to deal with the risk of
this type of opportunistic workout-the parties may bind all creditors
to a restructuring through a prepackaged bankruptcy plan. In a
prepackaged plan, the firm solicits votes on a proposed reorganiza-
tion from its creditors prior to filing the bankruptcy petition.212 This
plan is then filed along with the petition, and is quickly confirmed if it
209 See In reCheeks, 167 B.R. 817, 819 (Bankr. D. S.C. 1994); In re Club Tower L.P., 138
B.R. 307, 312 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991). See also United States v. Royal Business Funds Corp.,
724 F.2d 12, 15-16 (2d Cir. 1983) (dismissing bankruptcy where Small Business Administra-
tion had been appointed as receiver for corporation and had provided $3.5 million of
additional financing in reliance on receivership); In re Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. 1014,
1023 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (dismissing case because of prepetition workout).
210 See Michael C.Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure 3J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 339-43 (1976).
211 Eve-of-bankruptcy conflicts are present in numerous forms other than bankruptcy
waivers and are generally dealt with through preference law. SeeJackson & Scott, supra
note 75, at 169-71.
212 11 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (1994) permits votes solicited prepetition to be counted in the




satisfies the Bankruptcy Code's requirements. The prepackaged
bankruptcy is intended to minimize the duration-and therefore the
cost-of the bankruptcy proceeding.215 Thus, the Bankruptcy Code
attempts to offer a relatively low-cost option in which the parties use
the confirmation process to establish conclusively that a workout is an
attempt to maximize value, rather than take advantage of more vul-
nerable creditors. 214 An eve-of-bankruptcy workout containing a
waiver is, however, essentially a prepackaged plan that has never been
submitted to the creditors as a group, or to the court, for approval.
Because an eve-of-bankruptcy workout may be motivated by redistribu-
tive rather than efficiency goals, courts should be leery of routinely
permitting parties to bypass the confirmation process through work-
outs containing bankruptcy waivers. 215
Given the availability of the prepackaged plan alternative, should
parties ever be allowed to bypass this process and bind others to the
effects of a waiver? Although a successful prepackage lowers the costs
of bankruptcy substantially, a prepackaged plan is still very expensive
compared with a contractual resolution. More importantly, firms are
often reluctant to file for bankruptcy with a prepackaged plan because
of the concern that unexpected objections or complications could re-
suit in a fully contested bankruptcy case. Counting on a quick and
inexpensive bankruptcy is a risky proposition. 216 Also, filing for bank-
213 See Steven . Gross & George E.B. Maguire, Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plans, in CHAP-
r 11 BusINEss REORGANIZATIONS 1994, at 433, 435-36 (PLI Com. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. A-682, 1994) (citing four cases in which plans were confirmed within
three months of filing).
214 This is done by requiring that claims be grouped into similar classes, and that the
plan not be confirmed without the consent of at least one-half of the creditors, holding at
least two-thirds of the value of the claims, in each class that is not left "unimpaired". See 11
U.S.C. § 1124 (1994) (defining impairment); 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1994) (defining accept-
ance by a class); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (8) (1994) (each class must either accept the plan or
be unimpaired). The requirement that each impaired class accept the plan may be dis-
pensed with if at least one impaired class accepts the plan, see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (10)
(1994), and the absolute priority rule is complied with, see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1994).
215 Cases that have honored waivers negotiated in workouts generally consider settle-
ments that include the vast majority of the firm's creditors. Thus, the concern that the
waiver might be a means of transferring value from nonconsenting creditors is mitigated.
See, e.g., In re Club Tower, 138 B.R. 307, 309 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991) (debtor had "only a
few unsecured creditors whose claims are de minimis"); In re Orange Park South Parmer-
ship, 79 B.R. 79, 81 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987) (debtor had only one legitimate unsecured
creditor, with claim of $1,100); In re Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. 1014, 1015 n.2 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1982) (all but three creditors, who were insiders, were included in the settlement
agreement).
216 It is impossible to know in advance that a prepackaged plan and solicitation of vote
will be held to meet the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, firms and creditors
may be reluctant to rely on the prepack provisions of the Code. See Lillian E. Kraemer &
Richard B. Paige, Consenstua Workouts-Bankruptcy Alternative for the 1990s?, in 15 BANKING
AND COM. Lm' XNG L. 419, 449-51 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Banking & Com. Lending
Law Vol. XV, Richard T. Nassberg ed., San Francisco, Cal., Mar. 10-12, 1994).
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ruptcy may result in negative publicity which many firms would prefer
to avoid. Recognizing the advantages of private workouts, Congress
provided that the bankruptcy courts could abstain from a case initi-
ated by a creditor holding out from a consensual resolution.217
Clearly, a waiver included in a prepackaged plan should be accorded
greater deference than one contained in a contractual workout, but
that does not mean that waivers incorporated in nonjudicial workouts
should be void.
E. Conclusion
If bankruptcy involves costs which in certain cases can be pre-
dicted to exceed its benefits, firms and their creditors will sometimes
find it efficient to contract out of the bankruptcy system. And the
costs of that system make it reasonable to believe that many waivers
are rational attempts to avoid a process whose expenses exceed its
value. Moreover, bankruptcy waivers may serve as a valuable tool in
overcoming barriers in workout negotiations. For these reasons, waiv-
ers could enhance the efficiency of the bankruptcy system.
However, there are reasons to doubt whether all waivers are effi-
cient. Some may reflect efforts to reallocate value from one group of
creditors to other creditors and equity holders. Courts must also con-
sider the likelihood that unsophisticated borrowers may agree to waiv-
ers without adequately evaluating their merits. Moreover, even the
most informed lenders and borrowers may not have sufficient infor-
mation and foresight to assess accurately whether a bankruptcy, occur-
ring under uncertain conditions some years down the road, will be
worth the cost to pursue. With these points in mind, the following
sections attempt to specify with greater clarity the role that waivers
should play under the current provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
217 The court may abstain from, suspend, or dismiss a case if "the interests of creditors
and the debtor would be better served by such dismissal or suspension...." 11 U.S.C.
§ 305(a) (1) (1994). Out-of-court workouts might present one circumstance justifying ab-
stention under this provision.
The court may dismiss or suspend under [section 305(a) (1)], for example,
if an arrangement is being worked out by creditors and the debtor out of
court, there is no prejudice to the rights of creditors in that arrangement,
and an involuntary case has been commenced by a few recalcitrant credi-
tors to provide a basis for future threats to extract full payment.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 325 (1977), S. REP. No. 95-989, at 35 (1978), repinted in 1978
U.S.C.CLN. 5787, 6281. For an opinion dismissing a bankruptcy filing on essentially this
ground, see In re Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.1. 1014, 1021-23 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982). How-
ever, the requirement that the interests of the debtor be better served by dismissal makes it
difficult to argue that a voluntary filing can be dismissed under this provision. See Hartigan
v. Pine Lake Village Apartment Co. (In re Pine Lake Village Apartment Co.), 16 B.R. 750,




PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF WAIVERS
Waivers could best be implemented by explicitly amending the
Bankruptcy Code to permit business entities to waive their rights, sub-
ject to limited judicial review. 21 8 Such legislation could clearly define
permissible waivers and the proper grounds for challenging their en-
forcement It would also provide an opportunity to re-evaluate the
restriction in section 706(a) against waiving reorganization rights
while retaining liquidation rights. Moreover, to the extent that public
notice is deemed necessary or helpful to provide a fair opportunity for
unsecured creditors to adjust their relationship with the firm, the pub-
lic recordation of waivers could be established.2 1 9
However, even without legislative reform, bankruptcy courts have
the authority to consider waivers in determining the proper resolution
of a bankruptcy case. The Code does not prohibit a firm from waiving
its right or restricting its ability to file a voluntary petition, or from
waiving the automatic stay. In each of these cases, the effect of the
waiver will be raised by motion, and the court will have to determine
whether there is "cause" to enforce the waiver. 220
In addressing this question, the court must begin with the fact
that the firm agreed to relinquish its rights, thus presenting a prima
facie case that, at the time, the firm believed that those rights carried
costs in excess of their benefits. By giving a presumption of enforce-
ability to waivers, courts would permit firms and their creditors to act
on their beliefs and structure their relationships in the most cost-effec-
tive manner.
However, opposing parties22 should be given an opportunity to
rebut this presumption. Such challenges should be limited to a few
narrow grounds: First, that the secured creditor and equity holders
negotiated the waiver in order to reallocate value away from un-
218 For a detailed proposal implementing this idea, see Rasmussen, supra note 4, at
100-07.
219 See supra text accompanying note 183.
220 See supra Part 1H.A_
221 Several recent cases have held that a waiver of the automatic stay bars the debtor
from contesting the creditor's motion for relief from the stay, but that other creditors
(who were not parties to the agreement) may still contest the motion. See In re Powers, 170
B.R. 480, 483-84 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994); In re Cheeks, 167 B.R. 817, 819-20 (Bankr. D.S.C.
1994); cf B.O.S.S. Partners I v. Tucker (In re B.O.S.S. Parmers I), 37 B.R. 348, 351 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1984) (holding that postpetition stipulation waiving the automatic stay bars
debtor from contesting the motion for relief from stay absent extraordinary circum-
stances). This approach ignores a collective action problem: even if the waiver should not
be enforced, no individual creditor may have a large enough stake to incur the legal costs
of bringing a challenge. Thus, if challenges are to be permitted, the debtor must be al-
lowed to bring them. What is needed is not a rule of standing that prevents waivers from




secured creditors.222 Second, that the waiver represents overreaching
by the lender at the expense of an unsophisticated borrower. 223
Third, that a substantial and unpredictable change in circumstances
warrants the conclusion that the ex ante judgment of the firm and its
creditor has been superseded by events. 224 And fourth, that extraordi-
nary public interests override the contractual waiver. 225
If the presumption of validity is to have meaning, opponents
should bear a heavy burden in seeking to overturn a waiver. First, the
party opposing the waiver might show that the waiver was intended to
advantage the secured creditor and equity holders at the direct ex-
pense of unsecured creditors. In this case, the waiver does not repre-
sent a good faith judgment about the total costs and benefits of the
rights waived and so loses its justification for enforcement. Direct evi-
dence of the intention of the parties will be rare, and the showing will
have to be made from evidence of the debtor's business circumstances
at the time of the waiver. However, one seeking to invalidate a waiver
on this ground should bear an extremely heavy burden. Given that
bankruptcy generally inures to the benefit of equity holders (if any-
one) rather than unsecured creditors,226 courts should be highly skep-
tical of claims that a waiver was intended to transfer bankruptcy value
away from unsecured creditors.227 More specifically, if the agreement
was executed well in advance of bankruptcy,228 or if unsecured credi-
tors provide only a minor share of the firm's debt,22 9 such arguments
can be given short shrift.
Conversely, an objection would gain credence if the waiver was
negotiated when the firm was approaching bankruptcy, or if the credi-
tor seeking to enforce the waiver is substantially oversecured. 230 In
particular, where a waiver is negotiated shortly before bankruptcy in -a
workout that fails, the court should be somewhat more willing to con-
222 See supra Parts IVA, V.D.
223 See supra Part IV.C.
224 See supra Part III.B.
225 See supra Part III.C.
226 See supra Part II.B.
227 That is, if bankruptcy generally does not aid unsecured creditors, then waivers sel-
dom harm them. Rather, if bankruptcy aids equity holders, then a waiver represents a
decision by equity holders (or by management on their behalf) to waive their own rights in
exchange for improved credit terms.
228 If the firm is solvent when the waiver is given, any reduction in firm value through
the surrender of bankruptcy rights would be borne by equity holders. Thus, waivers well in
advance of bankruptcy presumably reflect a fair balancing of the costs and benefits. More-
over, if the waiver is well in advance of filing, then many contractual unsecured creditors
will have time to readjust their relationship with the firm in light of the waiver.
229 Reallocating a small amount of value from minor creditors is not a credible expla-
nation for a firm waiving its bankruptcy rights.
230 See In re Sky Group Int'l, Inc., 108 B.R. 86, 89-90 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (refusing




sider whether there is merit to this objection. Courts have noted the
importance of enforcing waivers to facilitate the negotiation of out-of-
court restructurings.23 ' But while focusing on this vital concern, the
cases fail to recognize the risks of eve-of-bankruptcy strategic behavior:
waivers negotiated in anticipation of bankruptcy present an enhanced
risk that the firm is benefiting a preferred creditor (and equity hold-
ers) at the expense of other creditors.23 2 Thus, for waivers negotiated
within a year of the bankruptcy petition, the court should consider
whether the waiver was part of a zero-sum, or negative-sum, attempt to
reallocate value.23 3 A firm and creditor can avoid this scrutiny and
preempt the challenge by putting the waiver in a prepackaged plan
instead of a contract.23 4 Even after acknowledging these concerns,
however, there are good reasons to favor out-of-court workouts over
bankruptcy proceedings, and waivers may play a crucial role in negoti-
ating successful workouts.23 5 Accordingly, the validity of a waiver in a
workout agreement should be presumed, absent a clear and convinc-
ing showing of improper purpose.
The court should also examine the procedural fairness of the ne-
gotiations surrounding the waiver if the borrower is relatively unso-
phisticated.236 However, if the borrower was represented by counsel,
or if the waiver was specifically negotiated rather than incorporated as
"boilerplate," courts should decline to second-guess the fairness of the
parties' bargain.
If circumstances have changed in an unforeseeable and dramatic
fashion, thus superseding the parties' prior evaluation of the costs and
benefits of bankruptcy, the waiver should be discounted because it is
no longer indicative of the value of a bankruptcy case. Ordinary busi-
ness reversals, mismanagement, economic recessions, and changes in
the marketplace, however severe, should be viewed as within the con-
templation of the parties, and not as grounds to set aside the waiver.
Rather, the waiver should be unenforceable only where a business suf-
fers a loss from a patently unexpected cause, such as a fluke natural
disaster, war, or other "act of God."
231 See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
232 See supra text accompanying notes 210-11.
233 A one-year period is suggested by way of analogy to the insider preference period
provided in Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. The concern here is essentially the
same as in preference law. that, anticipating bankruptcy, the firm's insiders are dis-
advantaging some creditors relative to others, in order to benefit the insiders. SeeJAcESON,
supra note 24, at 125-26. For the same reason, Rasmussen suggests a one-year period before
a change in a firm's choice of bankruptcy regime could take effect. Rasmussen, supra note
4, at 118-20.
234 See supra text accompanying notes 212-17.
235 See supra Part IV.D.
236 See supra Part 1V.C.
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A court may also decline to enforce a waiver where extraordinary
public interests warrant overriding the private benefit of the parties.
Precisely when such a determination is appropriate is a matter of great
dispute. Individual judges will differ as to when public concerns out-
weigh the financial interests of the parties under the "for cause" stan-
dard set forth in the Code.
Any of these objections will eviscerate waivers if not closely cir-
cumscribed. The ex post nature of court evaluation may result in the
regular disallowance of valid waivers because bankruptcy courts only
see cases in which, despite the workout or credit agreement contain-
ing the waiver, the firm fails. It would be natural for the courts to
conclude that many waivers are unenforceable, based on an ex post
determinatiov that the firm gained little from the waiver. As one re-
searcher explains,
[P] eople (judges) who have the set of information that existed prior
to an event (pre-outcome information) and have knowledge of the
outcome of the event are more likely to say that they would have
expected the particular outcome that occurred than if they actually
had been given only the pre-outcome information.23 7
In other words, knowing that the firm did end up in bankruptcy,
judges are likely to overestimate the likelihood, at the time the waiver
was entered into, that the firm would end up in bankruptcy, and so
are likely to believe that the creditor was taking advantage of the
borrower.
If waivers are commonly voided, creditors will refuse to give sub-
stantial value in exchange for them. Thus, factual inquiries into the
validity of each waiver, if carried out without recognition of the sys-
temic advantage of their availability, would eliminate their use in effi-
cient situations.
Given the potential value of waivers and the likelihood that courts
will continue to invalidate waivers that should be enforced, thus di-
minishing their ex ante value and usefulness, it can be argued that
waivers should be enforced without judicial second-guessing. It may
well be that the costs of litigating the enforceability of waivers and the
237 Thomas A. Buchman, An Effect of Hindsight on Predicting Bankruptcy With Accounting
Information, 10 Accr. ORGANIZATIONS & Soc'y 267, 267 (1985). Hindsight bias has been
well documented in the psychological literature, although it seems to be underappreciated
in the legal literature. Among the seminal works are Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight # Fore-
sight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 288 (1975); Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth Beyth, "I Knew It Would Happen"
Remembered Probabilities of Once-Future Things, 13 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFoRM-
ANCE 1 (1974). For significant recent works in the legal context, see Kim A. Kamin &
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post # Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight 19 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 89 (1995); D. Jordan Lowe & Philip MJ. Reckers, The Effects of Hindsight Bias on
Jurors' Evaluations of Auditor Decisions, 25 DECISION Sci. 401 (1994).
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risk of judicial error in determining which waivers are efficient out-
weigh the value of invalidating inefficient waivers. This possibility is
enhanced when we recognize that inefficient waivers may be modified
by the parties consensually.238 Nonetheless, under the present Code,
it appears that bankruptcy courts must make an independent determi-
nation of "cause" to dismiss a case or lift the stay. Moreover, there are
good reasons to permit some challenges to waivers. The problem is to
constrain the judicial reluctance to enforce efficient waivers. A strong
presumption of enforceability appears to be the best means of accom-
plishing this.
Although many decisions overlook the systemic benefits of al-
lowing informed firms and creditors to tailor their credit terms and
remedies through the use of waivers, a few courts have recognized
these benefits and accordingly granted a presumption of enforceabil-
ity. For example, in In re Powers the court wrote:
Once the pre-petition waiver [of the automatic stay] has been estab-
lished, the burden is upon the opposing parties to demonstrate that
it should not be enforced. In addition to ... [any drastic economic
changes since the waiver was granted] ... the Court will consider
other factors, such as the benefit which the debtor received from
the workout agreement as a whole; the extent to which the creditor
waived lights or would be otherwise prejudiced if the waiver is not
enforced; the effect of enforcement on other creditors; and, of
course, whether there appears to be a likelihood of a successful
reorganization.2 3 9
Significantly, the court appears to have weighed the prebankruptcy
benefits obtained by the debtor from the workout, recognizing that
creditors benefitted from a greater possibility of repayment even if
that possibility did not come to fruition. 240 Such an analysis properly
defers to the parties' judgment without relinquishing the court's obli-
gation under the Code to determine whether there is cause to dismiss
the case or lift the stay.
Two particular situations, single-asset real estate cases and securi-
tized financing vehicles, deserve specific mention because they are re-
curring situations that present the strongest cases for the enforcement
of waivers. The majority of cases in which waivers have been consid-
ered by the courts have been single-asset real estate cases in which the
238 See supra text accompanying notes 84-88.
239 In re Powers, 170 B.R. 480, 484 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994); see also Abdul-Hasan v.
Firemen's Fund Mortgage, Inc. (In reAbdul-Hasan), 104 B.R. 263, 266-68 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1989) (holding that the order entered in bankruptcy case prospectively lifting the auto-
matic stay in any subsequent case is effective, and creditor need not seek relief from stay in
subsequent case; if circumstances have changed, debtor should seek temporary restraining
order and injunction to prevent creditor from foreclosing).
240 In re Powers, 170 B.R. at 484.
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waivers were negotiated shortly before the bankruptcy filing.2 4 1 Waiv-
ers in such cases should be routinely enforced. These cases typically
involve few or no unsecured creditors or unencumbered assets. More-
over, they involve little or no going concern value because a building
is worth approximately as much in the secured lender's hands after
foreclosure as in the borrower's hands before foreclosure. No assets
are sold off separately and no economic value is squandered in such a
"liquidation." In these cases, a negotiated bankruptcy waiver repre-
sents a decision by the secured creditor and the firm that the ex-
pected costs of a bankruptcy proceeding (which would be borne by
the secured creditor and are largely of the type underemphasized in
bankruptcy court determinations) exceed its expected benefits. With
so little unsecured debt involved, the firm and secured creditor could
not have been motivated by the desire to profit from an inefficient
waiver that reallocates value from unsecured creditors. Thus, the
waiver should be enforced.
Structured financings present an even stronger case for enforce-
ment of bankruptcy waivers. Generally, a structured financing pro-
vides for an operating company to sell assets to a special purpose
vehicle (SPV) which issues securities collateralized by those assets.
The SPV is structured to be as protected as possible from the risk of
bankruptcy, and the purchasers of the securities pay a premium for
these protections. That higher purchase price is passed through to
the operating company by the price paid by the SPV when it
purchases the assets from the company. Thus, in the typical struc-
tured financing, the company receives advantageous financing terms.
There is no concern that the creditor securing the waiver has over-
reached, since the firm defined the terms of the relationship itself.
Nor is there a reason to fear prejudice to third party creditors, be-
cause securitized financings are normally a part of a firm's ongoing
financial strategy and their use to disadvantage unsecured creditors
241 See In re McBride Estates, Ltd., 154 B.R 339, 342-43 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1993); In re
Hudson Manor Partners, Ltd., 28 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 221, 221 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991);
In re Club Tower L.P., 138 B.R1 307, 308-09 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991); In re Growers Proper-
ties No. 56 Ltd., 117 B.R. 1015, 1020 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); In re Citadel Properties, Inc.,
86 B.R. 275, 275 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988). In rejenkins Court Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 181
B.R. 33, 36-37 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995), presents curious reasoning in this regard. The court
refused to enforce the waiver specifically because it was dealing with a single-asset real
estate partnership. The court reasoned that the policy of encouraging out-of-court restruc-
turings was trumped by the long line of authority (citing only In re Citadel) and the public
policy barring consensual restraints on bankruptcy rights. The Jenkins court noted that a
waiver of the stay could technically be distinguished from a prohibition on bankruptcy
filing but, in the single-asset context, waiver of the stay essentially would negate the bank-
ruptcy. Following this reasoning, waivers by debtors that are not single-asset entities would




would be quickly reflected in changed contractual terms.24 Accord-
ingly, there is no reason to hobble structured financings with complex
devices to avoid bankruptcy. It would be clearer, less expensive, and
more efficient if complex structures designed to render SPVs "bank-
ruptcy remote" could be replaced with enforceable waivers. At the
very least, courts should refrain from using vague "public policy" con-
cerns as a ground for invalidating bankruptcy protections included in
structured financings.
CONCLUSION
The analysis presented in this Article is necessarily controversial,
relying on data and assumptions that are subject to both dispute and
revision. But parties will not wait until the final data is in (if in fact it
ever will be) before contracting for waivers, nor can courts wait for a
definitive theory before deciding the motions brought before them.
This Article therefore attempts to build a reasoned approach to bank-
ruptcy waivers, given the existing empirical, theoretical, judicial, and
statutory materials. These materials call into question the prevailing
rules that invalidate waivers of the right to file a voluntary petition,
and suggest a framework for analyzing the enforceability of these waiv-
ers and waivers of the automatic stay.
The suggestion that we reconsider the role of bankruptcy waivers
should not be surprising. The bankruptcy system has been subject, in
recent years, to substantial criticism (and congressional lobbying) for
being slow and expensive. These perceptions gain some support from
academic studies of the cost of bankruptcy, and they gain further sup-
port from the growing use of waivers. If bankruptcy is intended to
assist firms and their creditors, eyebrows should rise when those firms
and creditors regularly attempt to opt out of that "assistance." If, as
argued above, waivers reflect a rational response to a system that often
fails in its objectives, then they deserve greater respect than they have
traditionally been afforded. If the judicial resistance to waivers does
not change, firms and creditors will only continue their existing strug-
gle to accomplish the same goal with more cumbersome and less effi-
cient mechanisms.
242 Schwarcz, supra note 41, at 146-51.
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